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Leni 💻

@6c656e69

Security Researcher at @DonjonLedger. Microarchitecture, iOS security, side-channel analysis, fault injection. All views are my own.
leni.page Joined June 2026
38 Following 1 Followers 6 Posts

Latest posts 2

Leni 💻 @6c656e69
At the Donjon, we continue to evaluate the hardware security of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) algorithms. Today, we present our attack on a masked implementation of Kyber (ML-KEM).

Have a good read!
Ledger Donjon Verified account @DonjonLedger Jun 26
Our applied PQC series continues.

This time, @k15ab_ and @6c656e69 attack masked Kyber768.

Masking defeats first-order SCA. But with a centered cross-product and the right covariance model, a second-order CPA recovers the secret coefficient.

donjon.ledger.com/blog/second-or…
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Leni 💻 @6c656e69
It's been great working on PQC security lately, such an important topic across industries. Stay tuned!
Charles Guillemet Verified account @P3b7_ Jun 12
âš¡"Breaking Post Quantum Cryptography with AI"
A non-profiled deep-learning side-channel attack on an unprotected reference implementation. The convolutionnal neural network just plays the role CPA's correlation used to play.

The @DonjonLedger 's PQC journey continues. They pointed their open-source deep-learning SCA tooling at the NIST-standardized ML-KEM reference.
No clone device. No profiling phase. No fixed leakage model.
Only EM traces, chosen ciphertexts, and a small MLP trained per key hypothesis. The correct key is the one under which the network actually learns. ~400 traces. Unprotected target, no masking, no shuffling.

- ML-KEM is mathematically sound and standardized.
- A reference implementation running on a real chip, without countermeasures, leaks the secret in minutes.

PQC security does not stop at standardization. It starts when implementations meet real-world attackers, with probes, not just headlines.

Read the article: donjon.ledger.com/blog/non-profi…
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