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Creative Deduction
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Paleolibertarianism. Anarcho-capitalism. Austrian economics.
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The word “capitalism” was popularised by its critics. And ever since, the debate has been fought on their terms.
While "capital" and "capitalist" were already in use by the 17th century, the noun “capitalism” was only coined in 1850 by the French socialist Louis Blanc, who defined it as "the appropriation of capital by some to the exclusion of others". Pierre-Joseph Proudhon employed it in a similar spirit. In English the word surfaces in William Makepeace Thackeray’s The Newcomes (1854), where it simply meant the condition of possessing capital. So, even in early usage the word was either neutral or openly pejorative; it was not the self-description of the people who organised production for profit.
Karl Marx, the writer most closely associated with the critique of the system, never actually used noun, preferring the phrases "capitalist mode of production" and "capitalist system". For him the decisive features were the private ownership of the means of production, the transformation of labour-power into a commodity, and the extraction of surplus value through wage labour. Markets, private property and profit-seeking were not incidental; they were the institutional forms through which class relations operated and capital accumulated. Marx’s analysis treated these arrangements as historically specific and ultimately self-undermining.
Over the twentieth century the word broadened. It came to stand for any economy organised around private ownership, market exchange and the pursuit of profit, as distinct from central planning or collective ownership. In ordinary speech it is now frequently used more loosely still. Critics often apply it to any outcome they dislike that involves prices, firms or inequality, whether or not the underlying institutions protect property rights and open competition. Defenders sometimes use it to mean little more than "the existing economy", including extensive state regulation, subsidies and barriers to entry.
The result is a term that no longer reliably distinguishes a free market resting on private property from other arrangements. A system in which ownership is secure, entry is open and prices coordinate voluntary exchange is not the same as one in which political power allocates privileges, protects incumbents or directs investment. Yet both are called "capitalism". The word now conceals as much as it reveals. When it is treated as a synonym for free markets based on private property, it imports the older critical meaning - concentrated power, exclusion, systemic exploitation - into a description of arrangements that operate very differently. This allows critics to blame free markets for the failures of political privilege, corporate protectionism and government intervention. It also allows defenders to claim the virtues of free enterprise while defending arrangements that undermine it.
We should stop confusing the free market with the privileges granted by the state. One is economic freedom. The other is political favouritism. Calling both "capitalism" only helps to obscure the difference.
While "capital" and "capitalist" were already in use by the 17th century, the noun “capitalism” was only coined in 1850 by the French socialist Louis Blanc, who defined it as "the appropriation of capital by some to the exclusion of others". Pierre-Joseph Proudhon employed it in a similar spirit. In English the word surfaces in William Makepeace Thackeray’s The Newcomes (1854), where it simply meant the condition of possessing capital. So, even in early usage the word was either neutral or openly pejorative; it was not the self-description of the people who organised production for profit.
Karl Marx, the writer most closely associated with the critique of the system, never actually used noun, preferring the phrases "capitalist mode of production" and "capitalist system". For him the decisive features were the private ownership of the means of production, the transformation of labour-power into a commodity, and the extraction of surplus value through wage labour. Markets, private property and profit-seeking were not incidental; they were the institutional forms through which class relations operated and capital accumulated. Marx’s analysis treated these arrangements as historically specific and ultimately self-undermining.
Over the twentieth century the word broadened. It came to stand for any economy organised around private ownership, market exchange and the pursuit of profit, as distinct from central planning or collective ownership. In ordinary speech it is now frequently used more loosely still. Critics often apply it to any outcome they dislike that involves prices, firms or inequality, whether or not the underlying institutions protect property rights and open competition. Defenders sometimes use it to mean little more than "the existing economy", including extensive state regulation, subsidies and barriers to entry.
The result is a term that no longer reliably distinguishes a free market resting on private property from other arrangements. A system in which ownership is secure, entry is open and prices coordinate voluntary exchange is not the same as one in which political power allocates privileges, protects incumbents or directs investment. Yet both are called "capitalism". The word now conceals as much as it reveals. When it is treated as a synonym for free markets based on private property, it imports the older critical meaning - concentrated power, exclusion, systemic exploitation - into a description of arrangements that operate very differently. This allows critics to blame free markets for the failures of political privilege, corporate protectionism and government intervention. It also allows defenders to claim the virtues of free enterprise while defending arrangements that undermine it.
We should stop confusing the free market with the privileges granted by the state. One is economic freedom. The other is political favouritism. Calling both "capitalism" only helps to obscure the difference.
Like my children, people on benefits consume without producing.
Like my children, having the responsibility of looking after them means I have to produce more to consume the same.
Unlike my children, I don't know the people on benefits and they give me no joy - only costs.
Like my children, having the responsibility of looking after them means I have to produce more to consume the same.
Unlike my children, I don't know the people on benefits and they give me no joy - only costs.
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Is a good person simply someone who believes the things they stand for are good? Or is it someone who sacrifices to achieve something they believe in? The left’s moral self-understanding basically rests on the first definition - but is as shallow as it sounds.
Philosophy has always been clear, from ancient Greece to the modern day. Aristotle treated virtue as a matter of repeated action, not of correct opinion. A person becomes just or courageous by performing just or courageous acts until the disposition is formed. Mere assent to the idea of justice does not produce the habit. Nietzsche made a related point from the opposite direction when he argued that a morality which consists mainly in condemning the strong and declaring one’s own weakness virtuous simply allows the believer to feel morally superior without the risk or effort of creating anything. The goodness is located in the judgment itself.
This is what is so visible in much contemporary left-wing politics. Support for equality, climate action or social justice is frequently treated as sufficient evidence of personal virtue. The costs of the preferred policies are assigned to “the system”, to corporations or to future taxpayers. Personal sacrifice is optional and often symbolic. Once the correct view is held, further responsibility can be discharged by demanding that institutions change. This is the opposite of the older requirement that character be tested by what one is prepared to forgo.
Thomas Sowell’s distinction between constrained and unconstrained visions captures the same difference. The constrained vision assumes that good intentions are not enough and that trade-offs are real; therefore character consists in living with those constraints. The unconstrained vision assumes that social outcomes are mainly limited by the wrong beliefs or the wrong power relations. Under that assumption, adopting the right beliefs becomes the central moral act. The left has largely adopted this view and activists can therefore maintain high moral self-regard while shifting the practical burdens onto others.
So, the left preserve a sense of moral seriousness by aligning themselves with historical necessity, even when their daily conduct involved no unusual personal cost. The ideology supplies the goodness; all you need to do is to affirm your association. Something similar operates when political identity substitutes for demonstrated restraint or contribution. But belief is inexpensive. Action that bears its own costs is not.
Philosophy has always been clear, from ancient Greece to the modern day. Aristotle treated virtue as a matter of repeated action, not of correct opinion. A person becomes just or courageous by performing just or courageous acts until the disposition is formed. Mere assent to the idea of justice does not produce the habit. Nietzsche made a related point from the opposite direction when he argued that a morality which consists mainly in condemning the strong and declaring one’s own weakness virtuous simply allows the believer to feel morally superior without the risk or effort of creating anything. The goodness is located in the judgment itself.
This is what is so visible in much contemporary left-wing politics. Support for equality, climate action or social justice is frequently treated as sufficient evidence of personal virtue. The costs of the preferred policies are assigned to “the system”, to corporations or to future taxpayers. Personal sacrifice is optional and often symbolic. Once the correct view is held, further responsibility can be discharged by demanding that institutions change. This is the opposite of the older requirement that character be tested by what one is prepared to forgo.
Thomas Sowell’s distinction between constrained and unconstrained visions captures the same difference. The constrained vision assumes that good intentions are not enough and that trade-offs are real; therefore character consists in living with those constraints. The unconstrained vision assumes that social outcomes are mainly limited by the wrong beliefs or the wrong power relations. Under that assumption, adopting the right beliefs becomes the central moral act. The left has largely adopted this view and activists can therefore maintain high moral self-regard while shifting the practical burdens onto others.
So, the left preserve a sense of moral seriousness by aligning themselves with historical necessity, even when their daily conduct involved no unusual personal cost. The ideology supplies the goodness; all you need to do is to affirm your association. Something similar operates when political identity substitutes for demonstrated restraint or contribution. But belief is inexpensive. Action that bears its own costs is not.
The cost parts of the report will be adopted: more government support programs, higher disability benefits for severe disabilities, additional cost allowances for lesser conditions, legal rights to some sort of activity. Any measures to cut benefits will be discarded. 100s of 1000s of young people will be moved from NEETs to a government sponsored non-job and Westminster will celebrate a grand success. Tax payers pick up the bill. All very predictable.
Young people should have legal guarantee of job, training or support, says Alan Milburn. bbc.in/4zNPD7eView quoted post on X