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@DelwinStrategy

Military Strategy & History | Decoding Global Strategies & Past Campaigns| Data-driven Insights 🌍 | #MilitaryStrategy #MilitaryHistory #Geopolitics
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Delwin | Military Theorist Verified account @DelwinStrategy
I am starting a series to demystify some of the recent events in the Russo-Ukrainian war that have become shrouded by intense communication battles. The goal is to examine the bigger picture with a data-driven strategic perspective.

It is important to take a step back and gain a rational view on possible outcomes instead of relying on wishful thinking or overstatements.

The war has entered the last chapter of its current phase. Level-headed analysis is crucial to follow the unfolding events.

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#RussiaUkraineWar #Strategy #Analysis
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Delwin | Military Theorist Verified account @DelwinStrategy
Chère Madame,

Le respect intellectuel est réciproque. Il suppose notamment de s'appliquer à soi-même les exigences que l'on impose aux autres.
Comme je l’ai rappelé à plusieurs reprises, venir commenter sous les publications des autres, souvent sur un ton condescendant et avec des remarques dénigrantes, constitue déjà en soi un problème de comportement. C’est toutefois une pratique courante sur ce réseau, et je passe généralement outre, même s'il m'arrive naturellement de répondre sur le même ton.

Pour ne pas en rajouter, je ne publierai pas ici de captures d’écran, mais voici quelques exemples de votre collègue auxquelles j'ai réagi :
- « Peut-être qu’un job chez Rosstat vous attend. »
- « Delwin est un problème en France. »
- « Franchement, DelwinStrategy, on dirait du mauvais Falkenhayn devant Verdun. »
Etc.

Si cela vous paraît relever d’un comportement standard, permettez-moi de trouver cela bien étrange. L’on récolte ce que l’on sème.

En revanche, lorsqu’il s’agit d’apporter la contradiction au moyen d’une « contre-analyse » dont :
- le calcul central comporte une erreur de 40 % (en se trompant sur la durée de la Première Guerre mondiale, excusez du peu !),
- puis compare un indicateur recalculé sur un périmètre différent,
- le tout sans appliquer ce nouveau périmètre au conflit Ukrainien pour vérifier si le résultat contredit mon propos initial. (ce qui n'est pas le cas, puisqu'une fois ajusté , le résultat amplifie mes conclusions),
excusez-moi de ne pas aborder cela dans un esprit de « agree to disagree ».

Nous sommes évidemment bien au-delà d’une simple discussion entre « chercheurs normaux ».
Surtout lorsque cette fameuse « analyse », commence par un magistral :
« Okay, let's correct that, shall we? »

Et comprend des réflexions de l’ordre de :
« You want to make a point? Start by quoting your source. You use Krivosheev's book? Say it. »
Ou encore :
« Quantitative analysis requires context, which DelwinStrategy, as usual, straightforwardly dismisses. »

Qui est condescendant ici ?

Car, au vu du nombre d’erreurs quantitatives, il aurait sans doute été préférable d'adopter un ton plus sobre, non ?
C’est précisément ce que j’ai fait en répondant calmement, la première fois.

D’ailleurs, entre « chercheurs normaux », on aurait attendu un simple correctif à la suite de ma réponse factuelle, polie et détaillée (que je remets en réponse), reconnaissant les erreurs de calcul et de méthode. Nous en serions restés là, plutôt que d’assister à une attitude désinvolte, faisant complètement fi de l’ensemble des remarques pour en rajouter une couche, tout en persévérant dans l’erreur.
Ce à quoi j’ai, il est vrai, répondu de manière assez directe, probablement au-delà de ce qui était nécessaire.

Car c’est bien là le nœud du problème. Si l'erreur initiale peut parfaitement s'expliquer par l'inattention, le refus de la reconnaître après qu'elle a été précisément démontrée, tout en continuant à prétendre donner des leçons de rigueur méthodologique est, lui, beaucoup plus difficile à justifier.

Je vous laisse seule juge du caractère unique ou non de cet échange et espère poursuivre ces débats sur un ton plus mesuré.
Isabelle Dufour @CPdM21 2d
Merci, avec votre dernière phrase, de confirmer ce que tout lecteur honnête voit très bien : votre but n'est pas de rechercher une vérité historique, ou même, comme tout chercheur normal, d'agree to disagree sur une analyse, mais d'humilier vos interlocuteurs.
Un comportement
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Delwin | Military Theorist Verified account @DelwinStrategy
[INTEL BRIEF] The Kerch Bridge suffered critical damage following a massive Ukrainian strike yesterday.
An excellent example of the saturation of air defenses against a fixed, vulnerable target, as well as the importance of human-in-the-loop control, possibly (though unconfirmed) using Starlink technology. The success is undeniable.
This is a good time to revisit my analysis of the Crimean Peninsula's logistical network, published in June following the beginning of the 40-day strike campaign. (See reply.)

Outside the tourist season, Crimea requires 52 kt/day of inbound supplies to function.
Under normal circumstances, the Kerch Bridge alone provides sufficient capacity to meet all supply requirements, including during the tourist season.
The situation would be very different if the railway bridge were hit. In the meantime, Crimea's supply lines retain significant excess capacity.
Should rail freight via Kerch be suspended indefinitely, the following alternatives would remain:
- Land bridge roads: Estimated maximum capacity of 25 kt/day. The destroyed bridges have been replaced by a combination of pontoons and covered concrete culverts (visible on satellite imagery). These are hardened structures that are easy to repair and difficult to destroy. We should assume that the AFU will continue targeting these crossings to interdict traffic. However, at this point, it appears challenging to destroy such earthworks faster than Russian engineers can repair them considering the canal is almost dried out.
- Land bridge railway: A similar engineered structure has been built at Armyansk, allowing rail freight to continue, although perhaps not at maximum capacity. Estimated capacity: 5–10 kt/day.
- Ferries: Approximately half appear to remain operational, providing an estimated 5 kt/day.
- Commercial ports: The peninsula's total dry port capacity is approximately 23 kt/day, but maritime traffic has been greatly reduced due to navigation risks in the Black Sea. Actual throughput could be as low as 5 kt/day, maybe even 0.
- Feodosia oil terminal: It remains unclear whether tankers are still operating from the harbor.
Total alternative supply capacity could range from 35 to 70 kt/day, depending primarily on maritime freight.

Therefore, even before accounting for rationing or population displacement to reduce demand, the remaining supply lines could be sufficient, albeit by a narrow margin, and remain vulnerable to recurring strikes against the engineered crossings over the canals and lakes.
Nevertheless, the risk of the peninsula being completely cut off remains negligible for the time being, particularly given the potential for adaptation under a wartime regime.

Let us also remember that the peninsula was supplied without either the land bridge or the Kerch Bridge for almost five years following the Russian annexation, relying on ferries and ports with a combined capacity of approximately 39 kt/day + Feodosia.

However, it is reasonable to expect that there will be no meaningful tourist season next year, which will weigh heavily on the local economy.
The success is important for Ukraine in the current context, a symbol as well, but the direct impact on the military operations will likely remain limited since the front is already supplied from hubs out of occupied territories.
#Crimea #UkraineRussiaWar #Strategy
Delwin | Military Theorist Verified account @DelwinStrategy Jun 17
(1/8) [ANALYSIS] The Crimean Logistics Strikes and the Limits of Blockade Claims.
There has recently been a wave of commentary about an alleged blockade of Crimea being enforced, often using maximalist language or implying a decisive strategic impact on logistics that could eventually force Russia to abandon the peninsula or negotiate over it. This framing is giving insufficient attention to supply routes capacity, structure, and the history of Crimea’s logistics since the 2014 annexation.

The point is not that Ukrainian strikes are ineffective since they clearly create disruption, congestion and shortages. However this is not the same as blockade, and route-capacity data suggests that claims of Crimea being cut off should be treated with caution.
Recently released AFU footage and satellite imagery do show damaged to the bridges connecting Crimea to the mainland and strikes on trucks along the highways. Yet, these represent only part of the broader supply chain into the peninsula.

Summer time amplifies the pressure.
Summer is an especially favourable period to create visible disruption because tourists can increase the effective population by roughly 25%, and most visitors arrive by road: around 76% by car or bus, including about 61% via the Kerch Bridge. This means tourist traffic shares routes with goods transport, creating congestion and bottlenecks.

In that sense, the summer tourist season is to Crimean logistics what winter is to Ukrainian energy infrastructure: the period when disruption is most visible and politically sensitive. A significant part of the current strain can therefore be attributed to seasonal peak demand.

Read on substack: open.substack.com/pub/delwinstra…

#UkraineRussiaWar #Strategy #Crimea
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Delwin | Military Theorist Verified account @DelwinStrategy
They can if someone else pays the bill. This is what I wrote about in my article “The Trap of Rational Ruin” in La Vigie.

Ukraine’s post-war defense costs will decrease only marginally, as the country must maintain significant deterrence. It therefore requires a ratified international treaty guaranteeing Western funding of those costs for at least the next decade (and/or the presence of 50,000+ foreign troops). Otherwise, Kyiv must continue the war to ensure a steady flow of funds.

Empty promises or memorandums will not do, because the risk is that external funding dries up, the army shrinks, and Russia exploits this opening to achieve its maximal political objectives.

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AMK Mapping 🇳🇿 Verified account @AMK_Mapping_ Nov 11
Ukraine has a population of between 20 and 25 million remaining.

There is no scenario where a country of Ukraine's size, let alone with such a devastated economy and massive post-war costs, is maintaining an army anywhere near 800,000 in peacetime.

This is just complete fantasy.
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