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Prof Rajeev Kumar

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@DrRajeevKumar1

Professor of Political Science I International Relations & U.S. Foreign Policy I Geopolitics, Defence, Diplomacy &Strategic Affairs I Independent Analysis I
Greater Noida profrajeev.com Joined August 2011
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Prof Rajeev Kumar Verified account @DrRajeevKumar1
Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 1.3.28
असतो मा सद्गमय।
तमसो मा ज्योतिर्गमय।
मृत्योर्मा अमृतं गमय॥

English:
“Lead me from the unreal to the Real;
lead me from darkness to Light;
lead me from mortality to immortality.”

2. Ṛg Veda 1.89.1
आ नो भद्राः क्रतवो यन्तु विश्वतः।

English:
“May noble thoughts and noble resolves come to us from every direction.”

Happy Diwali.
Prof Rajeev Kumar Verified account @DrRajeevKumar1
The president’s party normally loses congressional seats in midterm elections. Trump cannot constitutionally be elected president again in 2028. Clinton after 1994 and Obama after 2010 could tell their parties, “Follow me because I will be on the ballot again.” Trump cannot make that argument after 2026.

Trump’s defeat should not automatically be interpreted as a permanent Democratic realignment. Many voters appear to have voted against the incumbent administration rather than expressing deep enthusiasm for the Democratic Party.

However, a Democratic House and Senate can refuse to pass Trump’s legislative priorities. Trump still possesses the presidential veto. Repeated bargaining, veto threats and legislative deadlock may therefore resemble many earlier periods of divided American government.

Democratic congressional leaders are already discussing extensive oversight investigations concerning areas including Trump-family business interests, cryptocurrency dealings, DOGE activities, government contracts, immigration enforcement and other actions of the administration.

Trump’s final two years could become more externally focused, not less. Issues involving China, NATO, Russia–Ukraine, Iran, the Middle East, tariffs and Indo-Pacific strategy could consequently assume even greater political importance.

As President, Donald Trump’s institutional freedom is now reduced. At the same time, however, it would be a mistake to interpret a major midterm defeat as automatically meaning that the president’s political programme has permanently collapsed.

The tension between Trump’s continuing personal authority and the institutional transition toward a post-Trump Republican Party could become one of the defining features of American politics during 2027–28. #IranWar #Trump2028
Prof Rajeev Kumar Verified account @DrRajeevKumar1
SAUDI MONEY : Israel Hayom reported a Saudi offer of $1 billion to the Houthis through Iran to secure a ceasefire. One unnamed source claimed that Defence Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman brought the money aboard a military aircraft.
The report itself says a Saudi official did not confirm any transfer. The official Saudi statement confirmed the Tehran visit without announcing a financial agreement. Reuters and AP reported the talks but did not establish the payment. Iran was described as the intermediary, with the Houthis as intended beneficiaries, not as the recipient of a documented Saudi gift.
To remind, on 29 March, Israel Hayom cited an unnamed Yemeni journalist alleging recurring Saudi payments of tens of millions of dollars through Yemen’s central bank for salaries and budgets benefiting the Houthis. The article supplied no transaction records or named official confirmation. Its references to Saudi aid to Yemen do not independently establish Houthi receipt.
PolitiFact reported on 27 November 2018 that former US ambassador to Yemen Gerald Feierstein said Saudi officials had described an approximately $9 billion offer, made before 2016, conditional on the Houthis standing down. The context was relief, reconstruction and development. This establishes a reported conditional offer, not a confirmed $9 billion payment to the Houthis.
Similarly, the International Crisis Group’s December 2022 briefing and AP’s January 2023 reporting described negotiations involving salaries, reconstruction and security guarantees. Yemen’s own oil and gas revenues were central to the proposed salary arrangements.
On 23 December 2023, the UN announced commitments towards a roadmap covering a ceasefire, public-sector salaries, resumed oil exports and improved access through ports and airports. These were commitments towards an agreement, not confirmation of completed transfers.
In August 2026, UN envoy Hans Grundberg said the roadmap process had stalled and durable salary arrangements still required negotiation.

FINANCIAL OFFERS TO IRAN: HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS :- *1982: UPI reported discussions of a $10–25 billion Gulf compensation offer to Iran to end the Iran–Iraq war. This involved Gulf states collectively, including Saudi Arabia. Fred H. Lawson’s subsequent academic study described the failed initiative. No completed payment was established.
* A 2021 overture, reported by Amwaj in December 2023: unnamed sources suggested Saudi investment in Iran could reach $20 billion if relations fully normalised. This was a conditional investment possibility, not a verified cash transfer.
*March 2023: Reuters reported Saudi Finance Minister Mohammed al-Jadaan’s willingness to invest in Iran following rapprochement.
*November 2023: Bloomberg reported prospective Saudi investment if Iran restrained its regional allies from widening the Gaza war. No disbursement was established; Amwaj subsequently questioned whether the offer was new.

Saudi Arabia has long financed Yemeni political and tribal networks. Ellen Knickmeyer’s 2011 Foreign Policy report described substantial payments to elites and the government, including recipients opposed to the Houthis.

In August 2023: Reuters reported a $1.2 billion package for Yemen’s internationally recognised government.
In February 2026: Reuters reported nearly $3 billion budgeted for government forces and civil servants, including approximately $1 billion for southern fighters previously supported by the UAE.

February–March 2026: Saudi Arabia announced approximately $346.6 million for government salaries and operating expenses. The IMF recorded $119 million disbursed by March from the roughly $346 million commitment, in its accounting for the internationally recognised government.

Thus, Saudi Arabia has repeatedly used financial incentives to seek influence, stability and negotiated settlements. The evidence supports a history of financial diplomacy.

#SaudiArabia #Iran #Yemen #Houthis