Pinned post
Froyd
Verified account This account is verified. Learn more@Froyd369
thought criminal
7.1K Following 9.4K Followers 27K Posts
Latest posts 5
Exactly.
Yes, according to the New Testament.View quoted post on X
1 Peter 2:9 applies the Old Testament titles of “chosen people,” “royal priesthood,” and “holy nation” directly to believers in Christ (Jews and Gentiles). John 14:6 and Acts 4:12 state that access to the Father and salvation come only through Jesus. Those outside faith in him do not inherit the kingdom. Ethnic Israel retains historical significance and a remnant, but the NT redefines God’s people around Christ.
“The Network”
The KGB’s domestic informant network was a core instrument of political control in the Soviet Union - operating at a scale and with a purpose distinct from ordinary criminal intelligence.
Western estimates and KGB insider accounts put the number of secret informers (agents, “trusted persons,” and other collaborators) at roughly 4.5–5 million by the late Soviet period, or about 3–4% of the adult population.
This figure comes from calculations based on roughly 220,000 case officers each handling around 20 informants, plus broader archival research.
Some insider claims went higher (into the tens of millions when including looser categories of helpers). Official uniformed KGB personnel were around 490,000 by 1991 (including large numbers of border troops), but the non-uniformed informant layer was the real engine.
How it worked
• Informants were recruited across society: workplaces, factories, universities, schools, apartment buildings, and cultural institutions. Students reported on students, coworkers on coworkers, and neighbors on neighbors.
• The goal was not limited to catching spies or serious criminals. It included monitoring political reliability, ideological conformity, and “potential” threats. The system aimed to prevent dissent before it organized.
• A key method was profilaktika (“prophylaxis” or prevention): low-level offenders or people showing “incorrect” attitudes were summoned for warnings, lectures, and pressure from colleagues or community figures rather than (or before) formal arrest. This relied on the informant network for early signals.
• Special KGB departments or representatives were embedded in major enterprises and institutions to watch political moods and enforce security rules.
• Archival examples from republics like Lithuania show dense local networks (e.g., tens of thousands of agents/informants in smaller populations in earlier periods).
This was characteristic of communist one-party systems: the security apparatus sought to know and shape how people thought, not merely whether they broke specific criminal laws.
The KGB’s domestic informant network was a core instrument of political control in the Soviet Union - operating at a scale and with a purpose distinct from ordinary criminal intelligence.
Western estimates and KGB insider accounts put the number of secret informers (agents, “trusted persons,” and other collaborators) at roughly 4.5–5 million by the late Soviet period, or about 3–4% of the adult population.
This figure comes from calculations based on roughly 220,000 case officers each handling around 20 informants, plus broader archival research.
Some insider claims went higher (into the tens of millions when including looser categories of helpers). Official uniformed KGB personnel were around 490,000 by 1991 (including large numbers of border troops), but the non-uniformed informant layer was the real engine.
How it worked
• Informants were recruited across society: workplaces, factories, universities, schools, apartment buildings, and cultural institutions. Students reported on students, coworkers on coworkers, and neighbors on neighbors.
• The goal was not limited to catching spies or serious criminals. It included monitoring political reliability, ideological conformity, and “potential” threats. The system aimed to prevent dissent before it organized.
• A key method was profilaktika (“prophylaxis” or prevention): low-level offenders or people showing “incorrect” attitudes were summoned for warnings, lectures, and pressure from colleagues or community figures rather than (or before) formal arrest. This relied on the informant network for early signals.
• Special KGB departments or representatives were embedded in major enterprises and institutions to watch political moods and enforce security rules.
• Archival examples from republics like Lithuania show dense local networks (e.g., tens of thousands of agents/informants in smaller populations in earlier periods).
This was characteristic of communist one-party systems: the security apparatus sought to know and shape how people thought, not merely whether they broke specific criminal laws.
Anatoly Fomenko’s New Chronology is a theory arguing that the standard “Scaligerian” timeline is artificially stretched by centuries of duplicated events and 16th–17th-century falsifications.
It claims written history begins only around 800 AD, with almost no reliable records before ~1000 and most known events compressed into 1000–1500. “Ancient” Rome, Greece, and Egypt are said to be medieval events shifted backward (via ~330-, 1053-, and 1800-year offsets) and retold as separate eras.
Central is a vast Slav-Turk “Russian Horde” (Great Tartaria) that allegedly dominated Eurasia until the 17th century, absorbing Scythians, Huns, Mongols, Cossacks, and others as one people.
It claims written history begins only around 800 AD, with almost no reliable records before ~1000 and most known events compressed into 1000–1500. “Ancient” Rome, Greece, and Egypt are said to be medieval events shifted backward (via ~330-, 1053-, and 1800-year offsets) and retold as separate eras.
Central is a vast Slav-Turk “Russian Horde” (Great Tartaria) that allegedly dominated Eurasia until the 17th century, absorbing Scythians, Huns, Mongols, Cossacks, and others as one people.