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James Bosbotinis

@JamesBosbotinis

Specialist in defence and international affairs, particularly maritime strategy. Book Reviews Editor for @NavalReview
UK uk.linkedin.com/in/jamesbosbot… Joined February 2010
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James Bosbotinis @JamesBosbotinis
A review of this volume was kindly undertaken by @James_WE_Smith for The Naval Review: naval-review.com/book-reviews/t…
www.naval-review.com The Postwar Fleet, Volume 2, 1950-57 - The Naval Review 660 pages
Navy Records Society @NavyRecords 3d
📣 How did the Royal Navy plan for the Cold War on a tight budget?
Our 2026 volume, The Postwar Fleet, Vol. 2 (1950–1957), brings together original records from the Korean War to the 1957 Defence White Paper.

Read More: buff.ly/p35rq14

#NavalHistory #ColdWarHistory #NRS
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James Bosbotinis @JamesBosbotinis
This👇 “ The UK and its NATO allies should consider going “on the offensive” to defend against Russia - put pressure on the Kremlin, cause them a dilemma and create jeopardy” - look at 1980s’ forward maritime ops in the Norwegian Sea & how they were received in Moscow…
Iain Ballantyne Verified account @IBallantyn Nov 11
In the old days they called it SSNs and SSKs, and surface warships, in the seas off Arctic Russia, where its primary naval units/bases to threaten the NATO nations not least the UK were (and still are). Put 'em on the back foot...and the UK was tip of spear, along with USN. Govts since 1990s chucked it all away. Zero to offer right now - get the SSNs to sea again, procure some SSKs. Prioritise that ahead of F-35A.
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James Bosbotinis @JamesBosbotinis
.@edwardstrngr65: ‘We need the MOD today to resemble the Admiralty then, and that requires that cold-eyed realism to sit above the forces of all five domains and direct them in an integrated, and so coherent way.’
Edward Stringer Verified account @edwardstrngr65 Nov 9
The essence of this is broadly correct: there has been creeping managerialism across the senior military; spreadsheet-handling gets you promoted, weapons-handling leads to enquiries; smiling along and being right in the moment rather than on the fundamentals is the necessary, performative vice.

But it would be wrong to kneejerk to a reversion to pre-Levene, as that MOD was flawed too - compared to, say, the Admiralty of the 1900s, where political, financial and operational realities were squared away with a cold-eye on the genuine strategic requirements of the nation-state.

We need the MOD today to resemble the Admiralty then, and that requires that cold-eyed realism to sit above the forces of all five domains and direct them in an integrated, and so coherent way. Otherwise we will continue horse-trading each service’s pipe-dreams inefficiently.

The current problem is that the MOD leadership was allowed to reform itself during @JohnHealey_MP Defence Reform programme. The essential and vital changes, predictably, happened in name only, and the old structures and incentives with their associated clerisy attached still rule.

It is a well-worn story: incoming administration has good intentions that get derailed by vested interests. Indeed, in many ways it has been a two-year long episode of Yes Minister.
@StevenScrase
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