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Kyle Marcrum

@KyleMarcrum

Unqualified philosopher and former tanker. Views are my own.
Joined June 2014
551 Following 152 Followers 172 Posts

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Kyle Marcrum @KyleMarcrum
Our latest publication line, CLSC Fundamentals; short, focused papers designed for senior read books and academic syllabi. This inaugural paper is on the PRC’s version of competition, the Community of Common Destiny and the four major initiatives.

army.edu/News/View/Arti…
www.army.edu The Competition to Change the World: China’s Community of Common Desti For those looking to deepen their understanding of the Chinese Communist Party’s People’s Liberation Army—for personal study or for instruction—the CLSC Fundamentals web page serves as a reliable hub
Kyle Marcrum @KyleMarcrum
“China uses its navy to assert capability--what it can do by force. It uses its coast guard & other government ships as a paramilitary force to assert sovereignty--what it claims.” 🔥
SeaLight Verified account @SeaLightFound Jun 9
🚨THE BASHI BREAKOUT: 🇨🇳#China has, for the first time, pushed a paramilitary sovereignty assertion past its own "10-dash line" & beyond the First Island Chain to challenge a maritime negotiation it isn't party to.

On May 28, 🇯🇵#Japan & the 🇵🇭#Philippines announced they would delimit their overlapping exclusive economic zones as prescribed by #UNCLOS. Beijing's answer was to send a flotilla through the Bashi Channel & into the open Pacific east of 🇹🇼#Taiwan, into waters that even its own most expansive maps don't (yet) claim.

The key is in which ships Beijing sent: China uses its navy to assert capability--what it can do by force. It uses its coast guard & other government ships as a paramilitary force to assert sovereignty--what it claims.

Not one ship in this flotilla was a warship, because this was a sovereignty claim.

That's what's really new here. For over a decade China used these same gray-zone tactics to assert sovereignty inside its South China Sea "nine-dash line". This week's action pushed somewhere new--going past even the 10th "dash" Beijing added to its 2023 map.

Beyond the First Island Chain.

This assertion was aimed not at Taiwan alone, but at two 🇺🇸US treaty allies. @China_MFA branded the Japan-Philippine talks "completely illegal and void", while a June 1 @globaltimesnews editorial called the idea "an extraordinary and almost unprecedented absurdity… akin to two neighbors sitting in your living room and discussing how to divide your backyard."

Note how China's "backyard" continues to expand. So, in fact, does its "living room".

What SeaLight's tracking shows:
🔹 From 1-5 June, CCG cutters Daishan (2502) & Baita (2304) ran the first clockwise patrol over 200nm east of Taiwan's easternmost island--well past the 10th "dash" on Beijing's 2023 map.
🔹 Late on June 7th, a second wave of 3 provincial Maritime Safety Administration cutters & a rescue tug pushed into the Bashi Channel. The formation entered Taiwan's restricted waters ~30nm off the southern tip, drew a 7-ship Taiwan Coast Guard standoff, then also pushed east.

Beijing's state media left no doubt about what it all meant, first with an official @XHNews/@globaltimesnews announcement, then a June 7 Global Times viewpoint column naming the operation "a sovereignty declaration with both legal significance and political signaling."

Taiwan's NSC chief @josephwutw named it "expansionism in disguise," Defense Minister Koo said it was "cognitive warfare." Both are quite correct.

But the deeper target is Tokyo, Manila & Washington DC, since if Beijing can run a paramilitary sovereignty assertion directly against two US allies' lawful EEZ talks in waters far beyond even its own claim lines, the real message is that China's maritime claims are not just expansive and ambiguous, they are unbounded.

📊 Tracking by @StarboardIntel
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