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@MoveBit_

Sub-brand of @0xbitslab. A security team focused on the Move ecosystem, building the standard and delivering security audits for the Move ecosystem.
Audits ✉️ contact@movebit.xyz movebit.xyz Joined August 2022
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MoveBit Verified account @MoveBit_
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Sui 中文 Verified account @SuiNetworkCN 5d
🎙️ AI 时代下的链上安全|收听赢 USDC🧧

AI 时代,链上安全事件频发。一条冒充好友发来的链接,或一次没看懂就签下的钱包授权,都可能让资产蒙受损失。

用户怎么识别风险、避免误点误签?项目团队又该如何尽早发现异常,在损失发生前拦住风险?

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🎤 本期嘉宾
• Joy Wang|Software Engineer @Mysten_Labs
• Ivan|Founding Partner @Comma3vc
• 赵文萱|@MoveBit_ 首席安全研究员、白帽黑客

🎁 揪10人瓜分 200 USDC!
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MoveBit Verified account @MoveBit_
🧲 Sui Devnet Fixes Two Cryptographic Issues

On November 9, Mysten Labs released Sui Devnet v1.84.0, bumping the protocol version to 142. Two changes merit close attention: a fix for an integer overflow during ECDSA public key recovery, and stricter validation for Groth16 zero-knowledge proof verification keys.

Why should builders care about low-level protocol updates?

Because the security of the Move ecosystem isn't solely defined by smart contract code. When utilizing features like signature verification and ZK-proofs, developers inherently rely on the chain's underlying cryptographic primitives. If these primitives mishandle malformed inputs, those risks can propagate straight into upper-layer applications.

🔋 1. ECDSA Public Key Recovery: Overflow Cannot Be Ignored

The bug resided in the secp256r1_ecrecover function. During the calculation of r + n, if the result exceeded the bounds of a 256-bit integer, the legacy logic would suffer a numerical wrap-around, ultimately outputting an incorrect public key.

The fix is straightforward: the protocol now halts execution immediately upon detecting an overflow, abandoning the flawed result rather than proceeding with it.

🔋 2. Groth16: Verifying Keys Need Strict Length Checks

Groth16 is a widely used ZK-proof verification scheme. During verification, the number of elements in the key's vk_gamma_abc must precisely match the count of public inputs.

Previously, this logic lacked rigorous length checks. This update introduces strict validation: if the counts mismatch, the protocol throws an EInvalidVerifyingKey error, explicitly rejecting invalid keys upfront.

What Does This Mean for Move Developers?

Neither issue is structurally complex—one is an integer overflow, the other an array length mismatch. Yet, they serve as a reminder that security flaws don't always stem from sophisticated attack vectors; sometimes, they're simply the result of poor edge-case input handling.

For Move developers and security auditors, looking beyond contract permissions, state changes, and business logic is no longer enough. You must also scrutinize input validation, boundary handling, and error propagation in underlying crypto primitives.

This is why MoveBit continuously tracks core infrastructure shifts across Move-based ecosystems like Sui and Aptos : a genuinely comprehensive security audit evaluates not just what your contract writes, but whether the underlying capabilities it relies on are bulletproof.

Note: These updates pertain strictly to Sui Devnet v1.84.0. They do not constitute a Sui Mainnet upgrade, nor do they indicate any actively exploited vulnerabilities.
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