Neodyme

Introducing Riverguard 🏞️💂

A new security tool for Solana program deployers... 🧵

riverguard.io

Happy to publicly announce the new advisory!🎉

Small update on the unfolding Drift timeline: as surfaced in other threads (eg x.com/TheSoftwareJed…), the malicious proposal and execution were nonce transactions (those can be signed offline and not immediately submitted to the network).

The thing about nonce accounts is, that they have an authority set.
So we can go look on-chain to find nonce accounts that are configured to work with any of the new and old drift multisig members. When we do that with dune, we find *three* nonce accounts:

One created March 31st, used in exploit for 6UJb, member of new multisig:
solscan.io/account/EmYEry…

And two created March 24th. One used in exploit for 39Jy, member of old multisig: solscan.io/account/7s7s6s…

And one NOT used in exploit, for a key in old multisig 45cZ...: solscan.io/account/41zpDn…

This can be an indication that they were prepared to attack the old multisig before the migration happened.

There are two additional nonce accounts created by the same authority as the above three, that seem also related to the attack but are not multisig members.
You also don't have to set up the nonce account before signing a transactions. It is perfectly possible to keep that also stealthy, and only create the nonce account once you are ready to submit the transaction. But it appears the attacker didn't do so, and thus "leaked" all keys he wanted to be able to create offline transactions for.

Drift Protocol on Solana just got drained. It's looking like a multisig member compromise -- and the story starts at least a 20 days before the attack. Here's the breakdown:

Excellent discussion on the current and future landscape of Solana auditing. Thank you @mikemaccana!