So you agree anesthetics selectively block consciousness by randomizing orchestrated quantum states in microtubules, and have little effect on nonconscious processes because they’re already randomized. And we know anesthetics act by quantum van der Waals coupling to microtubules.
But then you want additional independent confirmation? Screw you. That’s more evidence by light years than other theories of consciousness.
Were you hired by the cartoon neuron people to mess with me?
But then you want additional independent confirmation? Screw you. That’s more evidence by light years than other theories of consciousness.
Were you hired by the cartoon neuron people to mess with me?
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Stuart, your latest explanation exposes a deeper problem with Orch OR.
You propose that anesthetics bind promiscuously throughout the body but selectively abolish consciousness by disrupting highly organized quantum states in brain microtubules.
But where is the independent experimental evidence that these special quantum states actually distinguish conscious from unconscious tissue?
You assume conscious brains possess them, assume other tissues don’t, and then use that assumption to explain consciousness.
That’s circular unless the proposed difference can be independently demonstrated.
And your claim that anesthetics produce only one effect is factually incorrect.
Volatile anesthetics also affect blood pressure, respiration, myocardial function and multiple ion channels.
Hemmings (2009) documented inhibition of neuronal voltage-gated sodium channels at clinically relevant anesthetic concentrations, including effects on presynaptic signaling.
So the claim that conventional neuronal mechanisms are unaffected is untenable.
Your dismissal of competing theories is equally problematic.
The 2025 Cogitate study challenged predictions of both IIT and GNWT, but also supported specific predictions of each. That’s experimental discrimination, not failure of neuroscience.
Meanwhile, your microtubule studies establish interesting molecular effects, including electronic excitation-energy migration. They do not demonstrate the sustained quantum superposition, gravitational objective reduction or causal necessity for consciousness proposed by Orch OR.
The fundamental distinction remains:
A molecule participating in biological activity is not automatically the origin of conscious experience.
And the fact that molecular interactions obey quantum mechanics does not establish quantum consciousness.
You repeatedly explain an interconnected living process by selecting one microscopic component and assigning it the very property you’re supposed to explain.
Here’s a testable challenge:
Measure the proposed organized quantum state independently of consciousness. Demonstrate that selectively disrupting it abolishes experience, and that restoring it restores experience, while controlling for conventional neuronal effects.
If you cannot distinguish your explanation experimentally from competing mechanisms, how can you claim it has more evidence than all competing theories combined?
You have proposed a mechanism for consciousness. You have not demonstrated that consciousness originates from it.
And my original question remains: Why must experience be produced by one isolated microscopic event rather than understood through the relationships constituting the living whole?