Inst for Science

Available Now: The Peddling Peril Index for 2025/2026 - the fifth edition of our in-house ranking of strategic trade control systems - is out! Get your paperback on Amazon here: a.co/d/03IH7cmh Explore the interactive PPI map and get your free PDF here: isis-online.org/peddling-peril… 

The PPI is a biennial project, using over 100 indicators across five super criteria areas to evaluate national strategic trade controls in 200 countries & entities. The PPI is the product of thousands of hours of work that draws from a collective decades of in-house expertise and an intensive effort to collect, compile, and review information from numerous sources. It remains the only public, comprehensive evaluation of the state of global implementation of export controls and it continues to paint a dire picture.  As in the previous PPI editions, countries could receive a total of 1300 points. Scores ranged from -232 to 1,129, meaning that no country received more than 87 percent of the possible points, and a few countries had very low scores.  Around 50 percent of countries evaluated scored below half of the maximum points in the PPI, with the areas of enforcement and proliferation financing most in need of global improvements. Additionally, over half of all countries lack relevant, comprehensive export control legislation.  

The PPI book contains over 300 pages of in-depth methodology, analysis, recommendations, and applications chapters in addition to the full rankings.  By identifying countries that are both leading and lagging behind in controls, the PPI aims to provide a key starting point for discussions in government, industry, academia, and the NGO community to improve the global implementation of strategic trade controls. 

Curious how your country performed? View its 2025/2026 rank, tier of supply potential, performance cluster, overall score, and subscores, here: isis-online.org/peddling-peril…

Pickaxe Mountain Elevation Profile: Where are the tunnel site’s key features?

We used Google Earth terrain data to derive the elevation profile of the mountain, showing the elevation levels of four key points: the eastern and western primary tunnel entrances, the probable ventilation port/shaft north of the ridge, and the possible ventilation shaft south of the ridge.  We previously reported on the elevation difference between the two pairs of tunnel entrances, which could mean that there are two separate tunnels; the facility has multiple levels; or the western tunnel progresses downwards to meet the other tunnel under the ridge.  In our early 2022 reporting, we considered various options which remain plausible. We newly discuss the elevation of the probable ventilation port/shaft, first identified by the Institute in 2024, and situated north of the mountain ridge, closer to the Eastern tunnel entrances. Interestingly, it sits at the same elevation as the Western entrances, indicating it is able to service either tunnel, both tunnels, or a combined tunnel.  It might also provide an opening for a horizontal tunnel into the western tunnel accessible operations area, i.e., an additional point for ingress and egress, such as for personnel.  It should be noted that it is serviced by electricity,  in addition to the primary eastern and the primary western tunnel portals.  The attached ground photo from 2005 shows its future location on the north side of the mountain.  Note: We confirmed the relative accuracy of the Google Earth elevation profile with high resolution elevation data.

Read the full report here:

isis-online.org/isis-reports/p…

IAEA DG Grossi’s summary on the status of Iran’s *declared*  nuclear program is largely aligned with our observations in satellite imagery; post June 2025 there have been some repairs at the Natanz PFEP and the above ground Esfahan facility but we also assessed them to be unlikely for actual reconstruction and more likely for shielding from overhead observation. The key declared sites where enriched uranium storage and/or enrichment took place at Fordow, Natanz, and Esfahan remain non-operational.  We do have concerns about sites associated with Iran’s UNDECLARED program however, past and present.  DG Grossi does not explain which sites the IAEA is monitoring when referring to "locations associated with [Iran's] past undeclared nuclear programme."  But it should include Taleghan 2, which is actively undergoing reconstruction, and Minzadayi, which sees high levels of activity around the site. The former was part of Iran’s crash nuclear weapons program codenamed Amad and investigated but never visited by the IAEA. The IAEA did find uranium particles at the building next door (Taleghan 1), despite intensive sanitization efforts, that were never adequately explained.  Taleghan 2 was linked to nuclear weapons relevant work as recently as 2024. Minzadayi was targeted by the IDF in March 2026 for its role in Iran’s most recent nuclear weapons capabilities and was linked in public reporting to metallurgy and to the Turquz Abad site, which is part of an ongoing IAEA investigation.  Also not mentioned explicitly by DG Grossi is the status of surviving centrifuges and Pickaxe Mountain, where centrifuges and components were moved according to @WSJ reporting on Israeli intelligence. Together with the enriched uranium, these are critical elements of Iran's nuclear program that could provide Iran a path to reconstitute its capabilities outside of declared facilities.

Quote from DG Grossi today: "As stated in my reports to the Board of Governors, the IAEA continues to monitor activities at Iran’s declared nuclear facilities and locations associated with its past undeclared nuclear programme. Also, and since June 2025, we have not identified any activity to repair or reconstruct any of the facilities damaged in the military attacks of 2025 and 2026."

NEW imagery update: Various levels of cleanup activities were observed at the three sites related to Mojdeh / Lavizan 2 following the March 2026 attacks: The main Mojdeh site was previously attacked in June 2025 and was undergoing rapid cleanup efforts, which the follow-on strikes in March 2026 appear to have effectively ended.  After several months of little activity, the attacked, large engineering-type building just north of the main Mojdeh site is currently in the process of being fully dismantled and cleared.  In the process, six containers that were stationed alongside the building before the attack were removed.  The remnants of the destroyed large building cluster at Malek Ashtar University have been fully cleaned up and the space was turned into a large parking lot accommodating the many personnel vehicles on site. See the figures for an overview of the area after the June 2025 war but before the attacks in the March 2026;  the various levels of cleanup activity around the area as of mid-September; and close-ups of the Mojdeh site, the engineering-type building, and the cleaned up area at Malek Ashtar University. 

Read the full report here: isis-online.org/isis-reports/v…

Pickaxe Mountain Imagery Update:

Vantor Technologies imagery from October 7, 2026, shows that the Eastern tunnel entrances remain blocked by earth. The earthen mound roadblocks leading to the Western tunnel portals also remain in place. See Figures 1 and 2. The two-month-long restricted access reinforces the assessment that the facility is currently neither operational nor continuing major construction. It supports public reporting that the facility contains valuable equipment and/or materials, such as centrifuges and centrifuge components, believed by Israeli intelligence to have been moved into the tunnel facility following the 12-Day War, as reported by the Wall Street Journal in July 2026.

Regarding an attack on the site, a combination of what was done at Natanz and Fordow in June 2025 and at Shahid Boroujerdi in Spring 2026 appears to make the most sense — using a series of bunker busters to target vulnerabilities in the mountain, such as ventilation shafts, coupled with collapsing entrances and destroying utilities and other support infrastructure outside of the tunnel. We have identified both a probable and a possible ventilation shaft location at Pickaxe mountain using satellite imagery. That said, it is possible that the U.S. government decides, based on the information it has on the tunnel site, that the MOAB, which is not a bunker buster but creates the most powerful non-nuclear shockwave, is best to inflict damage on the site. According to CNN reporting this is being considered. While Iran has a lot of experience building military tunnels and commonly adds blast traps by the entrances to prevent shockwaves from traveling down into the facility, these methods are designed to protect against much smaller shockwaves compared to the massive one created by the MOAB. Such an attack could place Pickaxe mountain in the same category that Natanz and Esfahan have been in for more than a year now: Forced, monitored closure, with lack of information about extent of damage inside.