The Iran Watcher

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@TheIranWatcher

We cover Iran and the Persian Gulf at the nexus of politics, power and conflict. 🇮🇷

buymeacoffee.com/theiranwatcher Joined November 2009

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The Iran Watcher @TheIranWatcher 51m

The United States is reportedly considering opening a ground war against the Islamic Republic through Iraq.

Iraqi newspaper Al-Mada reports that Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi briefed leaders of the Shiite Coordination Framework on three scenarios from a war plan reportedly presented to President Trump.

One scenario would involve American forces crossing Iraqi territory to launch an operation in southern Iran.

Another would involve the Islamic Republic pressuring Iraq to permit Iranian or Iran-aligned forces to advance toward Kuwait through Basra. The third scenario has not been publicly detailed.

This remains unverified reporting—not an approved invasion plan.

Neither Washington nor Baghdad has confirmed the scenarios, and there is no visible American deployment indicating that a major ground invasion is imminent. Al-Zaidi has also publicly pledged that Iraq will not be used to attack its neighbours.

But the report shows how seriously Iraq is preparing for a renewed American war against the Islamic Republic.

The United States is already pressuring Iraq to close all but two of its border crossings with Iran. Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein confirmed the request, while warning that sealing the numerous official and unofficial routes would carry serious economic consequences.

Iraq has already closed the busy Sheeb crossing in Maysan and tightened security along the frontier to restrict the movement of weapons, drones, money and other sanctioned materials.

These measures primarily serve Washington’s campaign to economically and logistically isolate the regime. But they also reduce the Islamic Republic’s ability to move personnel and supplies through Iraq during a conflict—making them useful preparation for several military contingencies.

Any ground operation would probably be limited rather than a 2003-style invasion and occupation. More plausible options include special-forces raids, temporary seizures or attacks against strategic military, energy and coastal infrastructure in southern Iran.

Even a limited operation would carry enormous risks.

Using Iraq as an American military corridor could activate Iran-backed Iraqi militias, destabilize al-Zaidi’s government and turn Iraq into another front in the war. It could also trigger attacks against Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and American interests throughout the region.

Washington is therefore pressuring Baghdad to neutralize the militias before any wider campaign begins.

Trump reportedly warned al-Zaidi that the United States would strike Iraqi factions and their leaders if they entered the war on the regime’s side. Al-Zaidi has warned militia leaders that they could be arrested if they attempt to drag Iraq into the conflict.

The militias are resisting. Several factions have backed away from surrendering their weapons, arguing that they must remain armed in case fighting resumes.

This planning is unfolding as diplomacy stalls. Secretary of State Marco Rubio says negotiations have not been productive and has called the regime’s demands “unacceptable,” “outrageous” and “ridiculous.”

The reported ground scenario may never be approved. Border restrictions alone are not evidence that an invasion is imminent.

But their appearance alongside militia disarmament demands, military contingency planning and stalled negotiations significantly raises the ceiling of what Washington may be preparing to do.

The United States is no longer preparing only for airstrikes—it is reportedly examining how to open a ground front inside southern Iran.

The Iran Watcher @TheIranWatcher 8h

The Islamic Republic’s air-defence network on Qeshm Island is being systematically dismantled at the entrance to the Strait of Hormuz.

Four explosions were reported around Bahman Port on November 8, followed by an OSINT report that the nearby Nariman air-defence site had been struck.

Iranian state media confirmed explosions and an impact inside eastern Qeshm, but officials have not identified the target, attacker or extent of the damage. The specific claim that Nariman was hit therefore remains unconfirmed.

But the wider military pattern is clear.

The latest explosions follow repeated American strikes against surface-to-air missile systems on Qeshm. President Trump confirmed that the United States recently destroyed a newly installed Iranian anti-aircraft system on the island, describing the operation as a limited strike completed within minutes.

Qeshm sits directly across the northern approaches to the Strait of Hormuz. Its radars, missile batteries and surveillance systems help the IRGC monitor shipping, threaten aircraft and protect coastal weapons positioned around the chokepoint.

Repeatedly striking those systems is classic suppression and destruction of enemy air defences.

Each destroyed radar or missile battery weakens the regime’s ability to contest the airspace. Each forced radar activation exposes another position, frequency and response pattern. Each expended interceptor further reduces what remains available for a larger confrontation.

This does not prove that a broader campaign has been ordered. It does, however, create the conditions one would want before launching one.

The United States appears to be clearing Qeshm’s air-defence layer, refining its target bank and opening safer air corridors over the Strait of Hormuz.

These are no longer isolated defensive strikes. They increasingly resemble battlefield preparation.

The Iran Watcher Verified account @TheIranWatcher 1d

The United States appears to be clearing the battlefield for a larger military campaign against the Islamic Republic.

In recent days, American forces have been systematically degrading the regime’s air-defence and missile belt along the Strait of Hormuz.

These are not isolated retaliatory strikes. They constitute a sustained shaping operation against surface-to-air missile batteries, associated radars, anti-ship systems and mobile launchers across Qeshm, Larak, Sirik, Jask and the southern Iranian coast.

President Trump confirmed that American forces recently destroyed a newly constructed Iranian anti-aircraft position on Qeshm Island within approximately five to 15 minutes. Similar explosions have been reported across the area for several consecutive nights.

In military terms, the United States is conducting suppression and destruction of enemy air defences, known as SEAD and DEAD, alongside counter-force operations against missile launchers.

The objective is to prevent the IRGC from rebuilding a coherent defensive and maritime-denial network around the Strait of Hormuz.

American forces are also reportedly expanding their use of decoy drones. These systems are not merely distractions. They are tools for dismantling the enemy’s electronic order of battle.

When a decoy enters defended airspace, Iranian radar operators face a choice. They can remain silent and allow an unidentified aircraft to approach, or activate their systems and attempt an interception.

Once a radar begins transmitting, American intelligence assets can identify its position, operating frequency, detection range, reaction time and engagement procedure. If the battery fires, it expends a scarce interceptor and reveals the location of its launcher.

That information immediately improves the American target bank.

Repeated probes therefore force the regime to choose between remaining blind or exposing its defences to destruction. Each night produces more electronic intelligence, consumes additional Iranian resources and reduces the number of surviving systems available for a future confrontation.

The geography is deliberate.

Qeshm and Larak overlook the shipping lanes through the Strait of Hormuz. Sirik and Jask extend the regime’s surveillance, missile and naval reach into the Gulf of Oman. Systems positioned across this belt can threaten commercial shipping, American aircraft, naval vessels and regional bases.

A larger American campaign against missile-production facilities, IRGC command centres, nuclear-related infrastructure or deeper military targets would require relatively secure approach corridors.

Launching high-volume strike packages while the coastal integrated air-defence system remains intact would unnecessarily expose fighters, bombers, drones and cruise missiles to greater risk. It would also preserve the regime’s ability to retaliate against ships and disrupt the strait.

The current operation is reducing that risk before any decision on broader action is executed.

It is producing three essential military effects:

▪️ Physical degradation: Destroying launchers, radars and air-defence batteries before they can participate in a larger engagement.
▪️ Target development: Forcing surviving systems to reveal their locations and behaviour so they can be struck rapidly later.
▪️ Tempo control: Keeping the IRGC reactive while American tankers, carriers and strike assets maintain the initiative.

The timing is also significant. American restraint during the midterm election period has ended. Limited strikes are now continuing while additional capabilities move into the region and the administration evaluates larger options.

This does not prove that a major campaign has been ordered. Shaping operations can also be used to maintain deterrence and protect maritime movement without proceeding to full escalation.

But the military logic is unmistakable.

The United States is clearing the outer defensive layer, mapping what survives and keeping the southern threat envelope suppressed. If a larger campaign begins, the work required to open its air and maritime corridors is already underway.

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The Iran Watcher @TheIranWatcher 10h

An Islamic Republic professor has called Pakistan’s Chief of Defence Forces an “American spy” who visits Iran to gather intelligence for the CIA.

Foad Izadi, a University of Tehran professor and frequent regime-media commentator, accused Field Marshal Asim Munir of being “America’s man.”

He alleged that Munir helped remove Imran Khan with American support and now visits Iran to prepare intelligence reports on senior regime officials, including Masoud Pezeshkian, Mohsen Rezaei and Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf.

No evidence was presented for these extraordinary allegations. Izadi is not an official government spokesman, but his language exposes the growing distrust of Pakistan inside the Islamic Republic’s hardline establishment.

Pakistan has attempted to mediate between the United States and the Islamic Republic while maintaining close military and economic relationships with Washington and Saudi Arabia. Munir has repeatedly travelled between the competing sides, making him indispensable to negotiations—but deeply suspect to regime hardliners.

Pakistan has officially rejected earlier claims that Munir travelled to Iran as President Trump’s representative, describing them as misleading and contrary to the facts. Islamabad insists that he was acting as a mediator seeking to reduce tensions and reopen the Strait of Hormuz.

The dispute extends beyond rhetoric.

Pakistan recently suspended trade through the critical Gabd–Rimdan and Taftan crossings, officially citing security and smuggling concerns. The closures stranded hundreds of trucks and disrupted the Iranian LPG supplies on which millions of Pakistanis depend. Pakistan imports roughly 7,000 tonnes of LPG from Iran daily, including more than 4,000 tonnes through Gabd–Rimdan alone.

The timing intensified suspicions that Pakistan was helping the United States restrict the Islamic Republic’s remaining land routes. Islamabad also emphasizes its strategic relationship with Washington and its obligation to comply with applicable sanctions, while regime officials insist that the trade disruption originated on the Pakistani side.

Other tensions are accumulating. Pakistan remains closely aligned with Saudi Arabia, while the Islamic Republic continues supporting the Houthis attacking Saudi territory. The regime is also expanding economic ties with the Taliban as relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan deteriorate. Cross-border militancy in Balochistan remains another persistent source of mutual accusation.

Izadi’s accusation should not be mistaken for proof that Munir is an American spy or for an official declaration of policy. It is still politically revealing.

Pakistan wants the influence and prestige of mediating with the Islamic Republic while preserving its deeper relationships with the United States and Saudi Arabia. The regime increasingly views that balancing act as infiltration rather than neutrality.

A relationship once presented as neighbourly and cooperative is becoming openly transactional, suspicious and hostile.

1:52

The Iran Watcher Verified account @TheIranWatcher 1d

Pakistan is closing a critical land trade corridor with Iran as the United States expands its blockade of the Islamic Republic.

Commercial traffic through the Gabd-Rimdan and Taftan crossings was suspended on October 17, disrupting one of the regime’s most important remaining routes for overland trade.

Gabd-Rimdan partially reopened after approximately one week, but restrictions, changing paperwork requirements and incomplete clearances continue to obstruct normal movement. Tanker drivers have reportedly remained stranded for days in Bandar Abbas after loading fuel intended for the Rimdan and Pishin crossings.

This corridor became strategically important after the American naval blockade restricted the Islamic Republic’s maritime access.

Pakistan had activated six overland routes connecting Karachi, Port Qasim and Gwadar with Iranian border crossings. These allowed third-country goods to enter Iran by truck when the regime’s ports were constrained.

The largest flow is liquefied petroleum gas.

Before the closures, Pakistan imported approximately 7,000 tonnes of Iranian LPG every day. More than 4,000 tonnes crossed through Gabd-Rimdan alone.

The disruption has imposed serious costs on Pakistan. The price of a 12-kilogram LPG cylinder reportedly increased by approximately 56 percent, rising from around 4,500 to 7,000 Pakistani rupees. Prices climbed even higher in some regions.

LPG is widely used for cooking, heating and transportation. Approximately 70 percent of the Awami Rickshaw Union’s 43,000 rickshaws and nearly 8,000 Qingqis depend on it.

Pakistan therefore has powerful domestic reasons to keep this trade moving. Yet it has still accepted the economic pain of restricting the border.

That reveals the balance of power.

Pakistan conducts approximately $2.8–3.2 billion in annual trade with Iran. However, its access to international finance, IMF programs, military cooperation and strategic partnerships remains far more dependent on the United States.

The cost of defying American sanctions pressure is greater than the value of preserving unrestricted trade with the Islamic Republic.

The restrictions coincide with Operation Economic Outcast, the American campaign targeting the regime’s remaining trade routes, aviation links, financial networks and sanctions-evasion channels.

The Islamic Republic responded to the naval blockade by shifting more commerce and military procurement onto land. Pakistan became one of its most useful alternatives because of the countries’ 909-kilometre border, established barter networks and proximity to major Pakistani ports.

That alternative is now becoming increasingly unreliable.

The border is too long and porous to seal completely. Informal trade, smuggling and limited authorized commerce will continue. Gabd-Rimdan has also reopened for certain consignments.

But economic strangulation does not require complete closure.

It requires making every shipment slower, more expensive, less predictable and increasingly vulnerable to interception, confiscation or sanctions.

The regime loses or delays revenue from LPG and other exports. Imported goods accumulate at depots and border crossings. Transport companies face changing rules, while foreign traders become more reluctant to risk involvement.

The political signal may be even more damaging.

Pakistan is a Muslim-majority neighbour with historic ties to Iran. It previously mediated between the Islamic Republic and the United States and helped broker earlier negotiations.

If even Pakistan restricts trade when American pressure intensifies, the regime cannot expect nominally friendly countries to sacrifice their own economic stability to protect it.

The naval blockade is depriving the Islamic Republic of oil revenue. Task Force Iron Gate is targeting its military supply routes across its land borders and the Caspian Sea. Operation Economic Outcast is pressuring the financial and commercial networks that keep those routes functioning.

Pakistan’s restrictions show that the blockade is no longer confined to the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman.

The Islamic Republic attempted to escape maritime pressure by moving its trade overland. The United States is now closing those exits through the regime’s own neighbours.

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The Iran Watcher @TheIranWatcher 12h

A regime professor conducted a rocket-fuel experiment inside an Iranian school - and the blast brought the ceiling down on the students below.

As part of its drive to militarize education, the Islamic Republic is bringing missile propaganda and dangerous military demonstrations directly into Iranian schools.

The experiment, conducted inside an auditorium in Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari province, released an enormous cloud of smoke before sections of the ceiling began crashing down near those watching.

This was not education but a reckless propaganda spectacle staged inside a civilian building meant to protect children and teachers.

The Islamic Republic has spent decades embedding Basij organizations and ideological indoctrination throughout the school system. Students are exposed to military drills, weapons training and regime rallies designed to prepare them for service to the state rather than for their own futures.

The collapsing ceiling captured the regime’s priorities perfectly: it spends billions on missiles, proxies and warfare while Iranian schools deteriorate from neglect.

Iranian children deserve safe classrooms, qualified teachers and the freedom to build their own futures. Instead, the Islamic Republic gives them missile propaganda beneath a crumbling roof.

0:17

The Iran Watcher @TheIranWatcher 1d

Pakistan is closing a critical land trade corridor with Iran as the United States expands its blockade of the Islamic Republic.

Commercial traffic through the Gabd-Rimdan and Taftan crossings was suspended on October 17, disrupting one of the regime’s most important remaining routes for overland trade.

Gabd-Rimdan partially reopened after approximately one week, but restrictions, changing paperwork requirements and incomplete clearances continue to obstruct normal movement. Tanker drivers have reportedly remained stranded for days in Bandar Abbas after loading fuel intended for the Rimdan and Pishin crossings.

This corridor became strategically important after the American naval blockade restricted the Islamic Republic’s maritime access.

Pakistan had activated six overland routes connecting Karachi, Port Qasim and Gwadar with Iranian border crossings. These allowed third-country goods to enter Iran by truck when the regime’s ports were constrained.

The largest flow is liquefied petroleum gas.

Before the closures, Pakistan imported approximately 7,000 tonnes of Iranian LPG every day. More than 4,000 tonnes crossed through Gabd-Rimdan alone.

The disruption has imposed serious costs on Pakistan. The price of a 12-kilogram LPG cylinder reportedly increased by approximately 56 percent, rising from around 4,500 to 7,000 Pakistani rupees. Prices climbed even higher in some regions.

LPG is widely used for cooking, heating and transportation. Approximately 70 percent of the Awami Rickshaw Union’s 43,000 rickshaws and nearly 8,000 Qingqis depend on it.

Pakistan therefore has powerful domestic reasons to keep this trade moving. Yet it has still accepted the economic pain of restricting the border.

That reveals the balance of power.

Pakistan conducts approximately $2.8–3.2 billion in annual trade with Iran. However, its access to international finance, IMF programs, military cooperation and strategic partnerships remains far more dependent on the United States.

The cost of defying American sanctions pressure is greater than the value of preserving unrestricted trade with the Islamic Republic.

The restrictions coincide with Operation Economic Outcast, the American campaign targeting the regime’s remaining trade routes, aviation links, financial networks and sanctions-evasion channels.

The Islamic Republic responded to the naval blockade by shifting more commerce and military procurement onto land. Pakistan became one of its most useful alternatives because of the countries’ 909-kilometre border, established barter networks and proximity to major Pakistani ports.

That alternative is now becoming increasingly unreliable.

The border is too long and porous to seal completely. Informal trade, smuggling and limited authorized commerce will continue. Gabd-Rimdan has also reopened for certain consignments.

But economic strangulation does not require complete closure.

It requires making every shipment slower, more expensive, less predictable and increasingly vulnerable to interception, confiscation or sanctions.

The regime loses or delays revenue from LPG and other exports. Imported goods accumulate at depots and border crossings. Transport companies face changing rules, while foreign traders become more reluctant to risk involvement.

The political signal may be even more damaging.

Pakistan is a Muslim-majority neighbour with historic ties to Iran. It previously mediated between the Islamic Republic and the United States and helped broker earlier negotiations.

If even Pakistan restricts trade when American pressure intensifies, the regime cannot expect nominally friendly countries to sacrifice their own economic stability to protect it.

The naval blockade is depriving the Islamic Republic of oil revenue. Task Force Iron Gate is targeting its military supply routes across its land borders and the Caspian Sea. Operation Economic Outcast is pressuring the financial and commercial networks that keep those routes functioning.

Pakistan’s restrictions show that the blockade is no longer confined to the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman.

The Islamic Republic attempted to escape maritime pressure by moving its trade overland. The United States is now closing those exits through the regime’s own neighbours.

0:09

0:05

0:06

The Iran Watcher Verified account @TheIranWatcher 1d

The United States is building a land blockade around Iran to close the regime’s last supply routes and complete its economic strangulation.

CENTCOM has established Task Force Iron Gate to extend the existing naval blockade to Iran’s land borders and Caspian Sea routes.

The task force was ordered by CENTCOM commander Admiral Brad Cooper on November 7. It consists of approximately 20 civilian and military personnel based in Tampa who will coordinate with the Treasury, State Department, intelligence agencies and other American institutions.

This is not a physical blockade involving American soldiers stationed along Iran’s borders. Iran has nearly 5,900 kilometres of land frontiers shared with seven countries, plus approximately 740 kilometres of Caspian coastline. Physically sealing that territory would be impossible.

Iron Gate will instead use intelligence, satellite monitoring, financial tracking, sanctions and diplomatic pressure to disrupt the movement of weapons, dual-use technologies, sanctioned materials and illicit revenue.

The task force is the next layer of the economic siege already being enforced at sea.

CENTCOM says the naval blockade has prevented the Islamic Republic from exporting more than $25 billion in crude oil. Enforcement continues against vessels entering or leaving Iranian ports, while humanitarian shipments remain exempt.

That blockade attacked the regime’s principal source of hard currency. Iron Gate targets the routes it began using to survive and rebuild.

A Reuters investigation uncovered a covert network of more than 5,000 entities connected to Iran’s Defence Ministry. Since January 2025, the network imported at least $2 billion in explosives, rocket-fuel ingredients, titanium, precision machinery, aircraft components and heavy trucks capable of supporting missile operations.

These supplies entered through several remaining corridors:

▪️ Russian-linked shipping across the Caspian Sea.
▪️ Truck routes through Iraq, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Azerbaijan.
▪️ Air-cargo routes originating largely from China.

Those imports allowed the Islamic Republic to replenish missile and drone inventories while American and Israeli strikes damaged its production facilities.

Iron Gate is designed to make that military recovery slower, more expensive and less reliable.

The operation could target trucking companies, shipping networks, banks, front companies and foreign intermediaries. Neighbouring governments may face sanctions or political pressure if their territory continues functioning as a supply corridor for the regime.

Recent American pressure on Iraq to close all but two crossings with Iran demonstrates how the system could work. The United States does not require checkpoints on every road. It can pressure neighbouring governments to tighten borders, freeze payments and block the companies transporting sanctioned goods.

The Caspian Sea will be the hardest route to restrict because it directly implicates Russia. Russian shipping and ports offer the regime a northern corridor that cannot be closed easily without confronting Moscow’s willingness to facilitate Iranian military procurement.

The Islamic Republic will respond through shell companies, forged documents, bribery, covert flights and smuggling. Its borders are too extensive to seal completely.

But complete closure is unnecessary. Every delayed shipment, sanctioned intermediary and restricted crossing raises the cost of rebuilding the regime’s military.

The naval blockade deprives the Islamic Republic of revenue. Iron Gate targets what it can import with the money that remains.

The objective is full-spectrum economic and military pressure without a ground invasion: deny the regime the oil revenue needed to finance terrorism and proxies, then deny it the materials required to rebuild its missiles, drones and weapons factories.

The Islamic Republic survived the naval blockade by shifting its supply network inland. The United States is now moving to close the escape routes.

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