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Brian Pak

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@brian_pak

ai + security + alpha
CEO @theori_io / @xint_official → building the world's best AI hacker
9x DEF CON CTF winner
CMU CS '11 | founded PPP & MMM
Seoul / SF theori.io Joined April 2010
214 Following 4.9K Followers 657 Posts

Latest posts 5

Brian Pak Verified account @brian_pak
You can't make everyone happy with vulnerability disclosure.

Disclose before every distro has a patch, and you're irresponsible. Wait longer, and you're accused of leaving defenders in the dark, without enough time to prepare for the storm.

Release a PoC that doesn't reliably work in real-world environments, and people call it overhyped. Release the fully weaponized, reliable exploit we actually have, and those same people would probably call us reckless.

I get it. There's no perfect answer.

But here's where we stand.

We care deeply about the security industry and the ecosystem we're part of. We want to push the boundaries of what's possible, contribute meaningful research, and do it responsibly.

And let's be clear about something else.

Of course we want recognition for the work we do. Of course we want the biggest and most respected VCs in the world to invest in us. Of course we want the biggest companies in the world as our customers.

We're building a company. We're ambitious. We're not going to pretend otherwise.

And none of that happens if nobody knows who we are or what we're capable of. So yes, we're going to make some noise. We're going to talk about our work, celebrate our achievements, and take every opportunity to show the world what we're building.

Of course we're going to market the hell out of genuinely cool work. Why wouldn't we?

And yes, we're really fucking good at computers.

But there's a line between promoting your work and putting the community at risk for publicity. We have no intention of crossing it.

That's why we make deliberate choices about what we disclose and what we don't.

We choose to disclose our findings once the official announcement is made. Why? Because at that point, capable threat actors already have enough information to start developing working exploits, with or without our disclosure. Especially in the age of AI. Keeping our findings to ourselves doesn't stop them. It just leaves defenders with less information.

At the same time, we deliberately choose NOT to release our most advanced, weaponized exploits. We have exploits that work reliably in real-world conditions, even with unpredictable network traffic and other interference. Building that level of reliability still requires expertise that your average "prompt hacker" can't simply replicate overnight.

Releasing those exploits would meaningfully lower the barrier to exploitation and potentially cause real damage. We're not going to do that just to prove a point, get more attention, or win some internet arguments.

These aren't arbitrary decisions. They're deliberate tradeoffs between transparency, helping defenders, and not handing attackers capabilities they otherwise wouldn't have.

I know some people will disagree. And that's fine. We can't satisfy everyone, but I genuinely believe we're making the right calls.

We want to build a wildly successful company. We want recognition. We want to win. And we want to do all of that while making the security ecosystem better, not worse.

Those things aren't mutually exclusive.

One last thing.

Wake up. We're not living in the same world anymore.

AI has fundamentally changed the speed and economics of vulnerability discovery and exploitation. The assumptions we've relied on for years are becoming obsolete. The old timelines don't work anymore.

We all need to adapt.

Just like any real hacker would.
7 replies 15 reposts 73 likes 6.1K views View on X
Brian Pak Verified account @brian_pak
Btw, I'm pretty sure we were the first and original reporters to these vulns (except for maybe 123633), given the CHANGELOG and the response we got from F5.

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We're tracking all five CVE for disclosure on November 18 OOBSN @ 7:00 am Pacific, and Xint.io is acknowledged in all of them.

CVE-2026-121810 - CVSS 3.1 - 8.1 / HIGH, CVSS 4.0 - 9.2 / CRITICAL

CVE-2026-123634 - CVSS 3.1 - 8.1 / HIGH, CVSS 4.0 - 9.2 / CRITICAL

⁠CVE-2026-113425 - CVSS 3.1 - 8.1 / HIGH, CVSS 4.0 - 9.2 / CRITICAL

⁠CVE-2026-123007 - CVSS 3.1 - 8.1 / HIGH, CVSS 4.0 - 9.2 / CRITICAL

⁠CVE-2026-123633 - CVSS 3.1 - 8.1 / HIGH, CVSS 4.0 - 9.2 / CRITICAL
5 replies 18 reposts 101 likes 11K views View on X
Brian Pak Verified account @brian_pak
Pre-auth RCE in nginx is the bug every hacker dreams of finding. It almost never happens.

Today we’re disclosing nginx2root: five nginx vulnerabilities, and an exploit that takes an unauthenticated attacker all the way to root.

One of themhits the default config.

If you run nginx, patch now. Then read: nginx2root.com

CVE-2026-123007, CVE-2026-123634, CVE-2026-123633, CVE-2026-121810, CVE-2026-113425
nginx2root.com NGINX2Root by Xint — From nginx visitor to root of the server host Xint discovered five nginx vulnerabilities, including CVE-2026-123007. From unauthenticated RCE to host root, chained with a kernel exploit.
79 replies 690 reposts 3.1K likes 667K views View on X