Here's a crazy stat. The Semiconductor Index is down 40% from its high and it's still up 12% this year.
Cullen Roche
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Founder & CIO @disciplinefunds 📊 | Author of Your Perfect Portfolio & Pragmatic Capitalism 📖| Defined Duration Investing ⌛| Board at Cambria ETFs 💸
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This is capitalism working. A company founded just five years ago raised private capital, built products people actually pay for, and spread roughly $270B of wealth across 5,300 employees. The founders own a big stake, but 87% of the value went to the people who funded it and built it. That's the system doing what it's supposed to do. Congrats to the Anthropic team.
Anthropic's 5,300 founders and employees are now worth more than the bottom third of U.S. households (45 million families).View quoted post on X
I'll be the new host of "Show Us Your Portfolio" on @excessreturnpod YouTube page.
Our first episode was with the one and only @MebFaber
I hope you enjoy it!
youtube.com/watch?v=mIXjHB…
Our first episode was with the one and only @MebFaber
I hope you enjoy it!
youtube.com/watch?v=mIXjHB…
70K+ likes on this. Oh boy. This world desperately needs an economics education to stop these socialism memes. Let's clear this one up.
Profit isn’t money. It’s surplus. In classical economics profit was the real surplus. Quesnay, Ricardo and later Sraffa all thought about profit in physical terms. Ricardo’s corn model is the cleanest example. You plant 100 bushels of seed corn, harvest 150, and the 50 extra is the surplus. The rate of profit is 50%, and you never need a price (or a modern financial system) to work it out because inputs and outputs are the same good.
Adding a money system on top of this just adds a way to record the surplus and account for it.
Those people in the field aren’t proof that there’s no profit motive. They’re the oldest example of it!!!
Profit isn’t money. It’s surplus. In classical economics profit was the real surplus. Quesnay, Ricardo and later Sraffa all thought about profit in physical terms. Ricardo’s corn model is the cleanest example. You plant 100 bushels of seed corn, harvest 150, and the 50 extra is the surplus. The rate of profit is 50%, and you never need a price (or a modern financial system) to work it out because inputs and outputs are the same good.
Adding a money system on top of this just adds a way to record the surplus and account for it.
Those people in the field aren’t proof that there’s no profit motive. They’re the oldest example of it!!!
View quoted post on X
I like Lyn's work but it's wrong to say bank deposit creation is "IOU" creation and not money creation. That treats state money as the only real money. It's an excessively government-centric view of how money gets created, a mistake MMT ironically makes too. Reserves sit above deposits in the settlement hierarchy, but that doesn't make deposits any less money.
It's fine to say deposits are an IOU, but deposits are absolutely money. They're the money households and businesses actually hold and spend, and they're accepted virtually everywhere. Banks make loans, which create deposits, and find the reserves after the fact. Reserve balances don't constrain lending for well-capitalized banks.
And it's not the bank's IOUs that "fail at scale." A loan creates two IOUs: the borrower's loan, which is the bank's asset, and the deposit, which is the bank's liability. It's the assets that fail, not the deposits. Asset losses are a capital problem and the Fed can't print capital. Deposit runs are a liquidity problem, and the Fed lends reserves against collateral. SVB had discount window access and still failed because unrealized securities losses had already wiped out most of its capital on a market value basis. Capital, not reserves, is the constraint for banks. Banks don't lever reserves. They lever their capital.
This matters for understanding the plumbing of the money system because deposits get created two main ways: when banks lend or buy securities, and when the Fed buys assets from nonbanks. Both are money creation, with different economic impacts. Treating bank lending as IOU stacking on top of state money diminishes how banks are major money creators in their own right and why the Fed interacts with them the way it does.
It's fine to say deposits are an IOU, but deposits are absolutely money. They're the money households and businesses actually hold and spend, and they're accepted virtually everywhere. Banks make loans, which create deposits, and find the reserves after the fact. Reserve balances don't constrain lending for well-capitalized banks.
And it's not the bank's IOUs that "fail at scale." A loan creates two IOUs: the borrower's loan, which is the bank's asset, and the deposit, which is the bank's liability. It's the assets that fail, not the deposits. Asset losses are a capital problem and the Fed can't print capital. Deposit runs are a liquidity problem, and the Fed lends reserves against collateral. SVB had discount window access and still failed because unrealized securities losses had already wiped out most of its capital on a market value basis. Capital, not reserves, is the constraint for banks. Banks don't lever reserves. They lever their capital.
This matters for understanding the plumbing of the money system because deposits get created two main ways: when banks lend or buy securities, and when the Fed buys assets from nonbanks. Both are money creation, with different economic impacts. Treating bank lending as IOU stacking on top of state money diminishes how banks are major money creators in their own right and why the Fed interacts with them the way it does.
Banks don't lend reserves. They lever reserves and make IOUs on top of them, rather than "creating money."View quoted post on X
But then whenever those IOUs start to fail at scale, the central bank creates more reserves for them.
Over the past 50 years, if the US central bank held reserves flat and banks kept making money, there'd be a 160-to-1 ratio between deposits and reserves, which would be untenable. However, whenever it comes even slightly untenable, the central bank creates more reserves and swaps them for assets from banks, boosting the ratio and giving banks more lending/leveraging ability to keep it growing.
The US bank deposit-to-reserve ratio is under 4-to-1 because the central bank accommodates bank lending by creating new reserves.