Twitxy Saved

ExVul

Verified account This account is verified. Learn more

@exvulsec

State-of-the-art Web3 security services (audits, pentest etc).Book an audit: t.me/realnolan. In time on chain monitor: exvul.com/skyeye-monitor
Web3 World exvul.com Joined September 2023
256 Following 5.4K Followers 992 Posts

Latest posts 5

Pinned post

ExVul Verified account @exvulsec
🚨ExVul Security Incident Analysis Update

We are officially engaged in the comprehensive joint investigation and on-chain tracing for the recent security incident involving the @cysic_xyz cross-chain bridge on BNB Smart Chain.

🔍 Current Investigation Focus:

• Attack Path Analysis:
Deep-diving into the database access vector and message processing logic vulnerability.

• Fund Tracing & Monitoring:
Tracking fund flows and monitoring the blacklisted recipient address
(0xA4e1827Fe2664fD0797a55e442b2e2639449C255), which currently holds ~2.8M CYS.

• Security Remediation:
Assisting in risk validation and security hardening before bridge reopening.

We are working closely with the Cysic team to uncover the full picture. Detailed technical findings and tracing results will be published in our upcoming joint report.
Stay tuned for official updates. 🛡️
#ExVul #Web3Security #Cysic #IncidentResponse #SmartContractSecurity
Cysic Foundation Verified account @cysic_fdn Oct 18
View quoted post on X
2 replies 7 reposts 27 likes 11K views View on X
ExVul Verified account @exvulsec
🚨 ALERT — Exploit on Ethereum

@k3_capital sBOLD vault was drained for ~$3.43M across ~34 transactions. Attackers used flash-loaned wstETH to repeatedly manipulate sBOLD’s share accounting through Liquity V2 self-liquidations.

The vault is now paused; the attack is no longer ongoing at the time of posting.

Root cause:
sBOLD’s totalAssets() excludes unswapped Stability Pool collateral below its 7,500 BOLD accounting threshold.

The attacker opened Liquity V2 troves, self-liquidated them into the WETH/wstETH/rETH Stability Pools, and converted sBOLD’s accounted BOLD into temporarily excluded collateral. This depressed the share price, allowing the attacker to mint disproportionate sBOLD shares cheaply.

The attacker then called swap() to convert the collateral back into BOLD, restoring totalAssets(), and redeemed the cheaply minted shares at the restored rate—extracting BOLD belonging to existing depositors.

This mechanism matches a drain path documented in ChainSecurity’s earlier sBOLD audit.

Attack tx:
etherscan.io/tx/0xaa3c7f00c…

Attacker:
0x23245F620d1e910ad76e6B6De4f8284A53C9Ad2d

Exploit contract:
0x2e3A51a05D66eC581fB47187A1abc8E3B1e2cFb4

Victim (K3 Capital sBOLD):
0x50Bd66D59911F5e086Ec87aE43C811e0D059DD11

Loot wallets:
0x23245F620d1e910ad76e6B6De4f8284A53C9Ad2d
0xDC0e2FDEb89D2F363F2EA1B50E923d464C414dAA
0xbabec2fc9a4993aB534D9D8d8fbb79F68E854dDb
0xf601D7646C2DB4940F0B1909b4835eD7279C5AEd
0x0fad97109a349e2c1b9ed82b25597eb6831d236f

Subscribe to our TG bot for real-time attack alerts 👉 exvul.com/skyeye-monitor
13 replies 9 reposts 140 likes 14K views View on X
ExVul Verified account @exvulsec
🚨 ALERT — Exploit on Ethereum

Unifund's legacy trading-group core lost 4.9941 WETH across five exploit transactions. The original EOA netted 4.7555 ETH after gas across its three transactions.

Root cause:
Unifund's swapExactTokensForTokens accepts a cyclic path with the same input and output token, then accounts the input-side and output-side balance deltas separately.

For WETH→A→B→WETH, both updates hit the same WETH ledger key, so each real swap gain is credited twice. In the flagged tx, the group physically held 5.628136547 WETH but its ledger recorded 10.256273095 WETH;

finish()+withdraw() paid the exact 4.628136547 WETH phantom difference from other groups' funds.

Attack tx: etherscan.io/tx/0x5f1e276e9…
Attacker: 0x6ee1702ca602ddab66f984aaebaac0451068f881
Victim (Unifund trading-group core): 0x152ad66bd57da8d539abaaf98d7c378621c36227
Vulnerable swap facet: 0x489176b37cb9da4149940707ce39135adc41cec5

Subscribe to our TG bot for real-time attack alerts 👉 exvul.com/skyeye-monitor
etherscan.io Ethereum Transaction Hash: 0x5f1e276e99... | Etherscan Aggregated Swap of 4 Tokens (ETH, iFUND, A, B) on 1 Platform (Uniswap V2) | Success | Nov-11-2026 02:02:23 AM (UTC)
9 replies 1 reposts 61 likes 4.9K views View on X
ExVul Verified account @exvulsec
🚨 ALERT — Exploit on BNB Smart Chain

GDC's Pancake V2 GDC/WBNB pair lost 51.225527 WBNB. The attacker EOA realized +50.008850 BNB after gas, while consuming 41,047.699285 pre-existing GDC. Using >806k BNB/WBNB of atomic capital, two EIP-7702 delegated referral accounts turned GDC's mid-sell reward callbacks into a reserve-manipulation window.

Root cause:
GDCToken._transfer checked the 10% sell limit and froze reserveFloorMode while the pair held 21M GDC, then GDCMain.

onSellRewards called untrusted referral recipients before pair settlement.

Those callbacks pushed 804,812 WBNB into the pair and swapped its GDC side down to the gross sell amount.

GDCToken._applyReserveFloorDistribution then removed that full gross amount from the pair and sync()ed before the outer transfer credited only 30%, leaving 66 wei GDC against 806,382 WBNB;

the 30% credit became apparent AMM input and almost all WBNB was withdrawn.

Attack tx: bscscan.com/tx/0x1427d8e6f…
Attacker: 0x09343312e8a2fd4f8c8ee130a7715587ab21125f
Victim (GDC): 0x39a90d082e19bd2ac30da6964d3d2fda50077777
Vulnerable GDC/WBNB pair: 0xe3349ca6ac1656e02b20b8d5a4c095e28255eb0a
Vulnerable GDCMain callback: 0x8955be303f033a837f7c3c407e0b2b3f9bc4fd5c

Subscribe to our TG bot for real-time attack alerts 👉 exvul.com/skyeye-monitor
bscscan.com Bsc Transaction Hash: 0x1427d8e6f5... | BscScan 0x09343312...7aB21125F Call 0x51913219 Method on 0xA7D63831...894418a4b | Success | Nov-09-2026 07:40:32 AM (UTC)
14 replies 8 reposts 81 likes 7.4K views View on X
ExVul Verified account @exvulsec
🚨 ALERT — Exploit on BSC

TENDRIL's Pancake V2 pool lost 550k USDT. The final exploit transaction paid 30K USDT to a hard-coded beneficiary after temporary liquidity was fully repaid; campaign profit is at most ~181,910.34 USDT after directly observed token purchases and gas, before an unpriced LP-position basis.

Root cause:
Every ordinary TENDRIL sell calls PoolControl.sellToken(A).

PoolControl then invokes the sender-restricted TENDRIL.controlburn(2A), which debits the V2 pair itself, and calls pair.sync() before the seller's outer 70% transfer arrives.

The msg.sender checks only authenticate the immediate Token and PoolControl contracts;

an unprivileged seller controls the full Token -> PoolControl -> Token -> Pair path. The burn drove the synchronized token reserve to 6,678 wei, so the delayed outer swap withdrew essentially all USDT.

Attack tx: bscscan.com/tx/0xfdff4fba4…
Attacker / profit beneficiary: 0xb87cf5ab84d0ab9545358cd30229627305331373
Operator / exploit deployer: 0xb81e4aafa347b27112b7f6f5de6cf7cd516021ff
Exploit contract: 0xc8cb6a2aa825a576e1470479046056fe414ee0f8
Victim (TENDRIL/USDT pair): 0x5de082471f2a9f01a61e467a32837dee830d99e0
Vulnerable TENDRIL token: 0xb1afdfd850da168f2cc9f742e11cdda5273973d2

Subscribe to our TG bot for real-time attack alerts 👉 exvul.com/skyeye-monitor
bscscan.com Bsc Transaction Hash: 0xfdff4fba43... | BscScan 0xB81e4aaF...D516021ff Call 0xf5a9a323 Method on 0xc8Cb6A2a...e414eE0f8 | Success | Nov-04-2026 04:02:45 PM (UTC)