Via @Kathleen_Tyson_
Qui a fait ça ? 😂👍View quoted post on X
@johnshreffler0
Qui a fait ça ? 😂👍View quoted post on X
Musk flat-out lied about Ukraine's Starshield network today. In our brief + telemetry clip, we explain why he's running this ToS shell game. The numbers provide the proof: 400-470 km/h verified military links, a 10% -> 50% -> 100% ramp to a hard 161 km/h gate, a -22.98% drop in hits, and zero Pentagon override keys. Model V maps the reason behind it. Stay tuned.View quoted post on X
The special military operation started with two goals: to “demilitarize” the Ukrainian armed forces, which were regrouped in the Donbass in preparation for an offensive against the DPR and LPR; and to “denazify” (i.e., neutralize) the ultra-nationalist and neo-Nazi paramilitary militias in the Mariupol area.View quoted post on X
There is a fundamental difference between a full-scale war and a special military operation: Russian authorities planned the ability to support the war effort through the existing economy without transitioning to a full “war economy” regime. Russia will continue as planned, driven by a long-term strategy. Everything is based on the symbiosis between the military and politics. As the classic maxim states, “War is the continuation of politics by other means.” Military action is not an end in itself, but serves politics: tactical victories and the achievement of military objectives ultimately lead to political victory.
In Russia, strategy is adapted to the adversary, not to public opinion. In Russian military thinking, as in most constitutional states, the strategic level is divided into political strategy and military strategy. Political strategy is a function of the decisions made by the country’s political authorities, while military strategy is the translation of those decisions to the military level. These two strategies complement each other and must therefore converge toward the main objective, which is inherently political in nature.
Russian military doctrine divides the art of war into three main components: strategy, operational art, and tactics. Each component has its own distinct characteristics, which are very similar to those found in Western doctrines. The strategic level is that of conception, where the aim of strategic action is to lead the adversary to negotiation or defeat. The operational level is that of cooperation and coordination among inter-force actions, with a view to achieving a specific military objective. Finally, the tactical level is the execution of maneuvers at the weapons level, serving as an integral part of the broader operational maneuver.
Tactical objectives must promote the achievement of operational objectives, which in turn must promote the achievement of strategic objectives of a political or military nature. In fact, in Russian military thinking, each level utilizes multiplier factors to enable the objectives of the higher level to be achieved: operational success results from the multiplier effect of inter-arms synergies, and strategic success results from the multiplier effect of achieving those operational objectives.
Ultimately, while the Russians see a fluid, two-way link between war and politics, the West tends to treat war as an end in itself. Unlike Russian military thinking, which is more holistic and networked, Western military thinking tends to be sequential and linear. This approach is even evident at the negotiation level. Whereas Westerners tend to view operational success as the sum of tactical successes, Russians view it as the result of multiplication.
The bottom line is that Russia will continue its operations until a long-term strategic solution is achieved. While Ukraine and NATO may attempt to force a ceasefire merely to regroup and restart the conflict in a few years, Russia has a definitive plan and will do whatever is necessary to achieve its objectives. It is crucial to look past the narratives of Western media, charlatan commentators, and so-called experts who simply cannot see the forest for the trees.
Regarding the trust between Russians and Western political elite and negotiations, from the Russian perspective, there is little reason to place unquestioning trust in Western political commitments. Western politicians are temporary occupants of political offices, frequently replaced through elections, changes of government or shifting domestic political priorities. An agreement negotiated and signed by one administration can be questioned, diluted or effectively abandoned by its successor, often without any meaningful political consequences for those who made the original commitments.
This creates a fundamental problem of credibility. In strategic affairs, a signature is only as valuable as the political will and institutional mechanisms behind it. Moscow has repeatedly demonstrated that it views Western political commitments through this prism: not simply as legally binding documents, but as arrangements whose practical value depends on the prevailing political balance of power.
There is an uncomfortable irony here. Western governments frequently demand that others respect the international agreements they sign, while their own political systems allow successive administrations considerable freedom to reinterpret, suspend or abandon previous commitments. From the standpoint of a long-term strategic calculation, trusting the personal assurances of a politician whose political lifespan may be shorter than the agreement itself is hardly a sound foundation for national security.
In the language of diplomacy, this is a question of credibility and continuity. In less diplomatic language, the personal promises of a politician can sometimes be worth little more than the paper on which they are written.