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To Salomon's "This freedom in asceticism is the last and ultimate opportunity for human self-realization in disintegrating periods" and similar passages in his 1939 Tocqueville piece, Strauss writes:
"But what does 'a natural world' mean? I find that you make too great a concession to sociology or romanticism by orienting yourself towards a somewhat healthy period in contrast to our sick period. I am inclined to believe that all periods as periods are sick, which does not mean that one period is not more tolerable than another. For example, Victorian England was more tolerable than post-war Europe. But was it therefore better in every respect? Wasn't the possibility of seeing the actual questions more seriously endangered by the Victorian pseudo-solution than by the uncertainty leading to the borders of barbarism during the 20s and 30s of this 20th century? In short: the natural world to which we must return cannot be any period of the past (or the future); because the human things are necessarily imperfect, always and everywhere. The advantage of the past (a very specific past) over the present consists only in that modern philosophers have taken from us the possibility of understanding the natural world, while certain pre-modern philosophers made a serious and partly even successful attempt to understand the natural world—this world, whose sun shines no less brightly for us than for Homer, as we immediately notice when we renounce philosophical terminology and call things by their names."
To Salomon's "This freedom in asceticism is the last and ultimate opportunity for human self-realization in disintegrating periods" and similar passages in his 1939 Tocqueville piece, Strauss writes:
"But what does 'a natural world' mean? I find that you make too great a concession to sociology or romanticism by orienting yourself towards a somewhat healthy period in contrast to our sick period. I am inclined to believe that all periods as periods are sick, which does not mean that one period is not more tolerable than another. For example, Victorian England was more tolerable than post-war Europe. But was it therefore better in every respect? Wasn't the possibility of seeing the actual questions more seriously endangered by the Victorian pseudo-solution than by the uncertainty leading to the borders of barbarism during the 20s and 30s of this 20th century? In short: the natural world to which we must return cannot be any period of the past (or the future); because the human things are necessarily imperfect, always and everywhere. The advantage of the past (a very specific past) over the present consists only in that modern philosophers have taken from us the possibility of understanding the natural world, while certain pre-modern philosophers made a serious and partly even successful attempt to understand the natural world—this world, whose sun shines no less brightly for us than for Homer, as we immediately notice when we renounce philosophical terminology and call things by their names."
Strauss to Albert Salomon (Jan '40), in response to the Salomon's Oct '39 Tocqueville pieceView quoted post on X
Strauss comments on only a couple of sentences in Salomon's article. Re: "The demonry of nature in the ancient and medieval world is supplanted by the demonry of social institutions to which man is bowing as before a catastrophe of nature" and another similar passage, Strauss writes:
"--The replacement of the natural world with a world created by men that has been carried out by modern philosophy. I also believe that this is so. It is, as it seems to me, the actual meaning of modern idealism and the concept of art as creation that essentially belongs to it (in contrast to the older notion of art as an imitation of nature). From which the unavoidable consequence is that one must first return to a natural world before one can even begin to ask: all presently possible answers are necessarily halfheartednesses"
The third Salomon sentence on which Strauss comments is "This freedom in asceticism is the last and ultimate opportunity for human self-realization in disintegrating periods"
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