Lyle Goldstein

Solid conclusion in fine article by @NiharikaSM et al. WSJ team is smart to quote my wise former colleague @rdmartinson88

"Extending its operational reach, the Chinese navy is also building a regular presence beyond the first island chain and training to prevent U.S. forces from coming too close to their country’s mainland in a war. In other words, it is expanding “strategic depth,” said
Martinson of the U.S. Naval War College. The goal, he said: “conducting high-end naval operations against another great power, the U.S., as far east as possible."

Yes, and (obviously) we would do the same if the roles were reversed. China's strategy is defensive.

Chinese armed forces work on drone logistics in rough terrain. CCTV7, Junshi Baodao, 5 Nov. Such logistics innovations could be crucial to a Taiwan campaign, of course.

"Russian Armed Forces Prepare for Winter Combat [title]

Those who follow the reports from the Russian Ministry of Defense have noted that, in the first days of November, the focus has been primarily on the improvement of tactical positions by our units and the engagement of the enemy from a distance. There have been no reports of the liberation of additional settlements from Ukrainian Nazis—a development that had become a regular occurrence throughout the year.

War correspondent Marat Khayrullin acknowledges that such questions have been asked with increasing frequency in recent days. However, there is no cause for alarm; the situation is easily explained. Regardless of whether it is peacetime or wartime, the year within the Russian Armed Forces is divided into two operational seasons for weaponry, military hardware, and specialized equipment: the spring-summer period and the autumn-winter period. The transition from one period to the next is a standard part of military life and requires preparation.

"Time is needed to transition weaponry and military hardware to winter operational standards, to provide personnel with winter uniforms, and to supply equipment with winter-grade fuel, oils, and lubricants. All of this takes time, as it is a substantial and serious undertaking," the war correspondent notes.

"Furthermore, in October, Russian military groupings conducted a series of large-scale combat operations across several directions, during which vast areas of territory and a significant number of settlements were brought under our control." Now, these territories must be occupied by consolidation units; command posts must be established and equipped; a frontline security and control system must be organized; and the communications and logistics infrastructure must be reconfigured. All of this can be summed up by a single term: regrouping.

Another factor influencing the current situation is the preparation of troops for new, large-scale combat operations—operations that, judging by the prevailing conditions, are set to unfold across most of the primary axes of the Special Military Operation. Throughout this process, the intensity of combat operations has not diminished; rather, the objectives and tasks have shifted. The primary goals now are to expand bridgeheads along the line of contact and to secure these positions,” explains Marat Khayrullin in detail.

At the same time, it would be incorrect to suggest that the Russian army is so focused on winter preparations that the frontline has been neglected. Active, large-scale strikes are being carried out against Ukraine’s strategic assets, resulting in the rapid degradation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ frontline supply system. The Russian Armed Forces are achieving successes on a daily basis, even if there has been a brief pause in their forward momentum.

The map illustrates the operational axes of Russian military groupings, as well as the primary supply routes used by the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Areas highlighted in yellow represent the road network currently under active fire, along with various settlements—key transport and logistics hubs—that have been targeted by strikes during the first days of November. (Map sourced from Marat Khayrullin’s channel.)
The map illustrates the operational axes of Russian military groupings, as well as the primary supply routes used by the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Areas highlighted in yellow represent the road network currently under active fire, along with various settlements—key transport and logistics hubs—that have been targeted by strikes during the first days of November. (Map sourced from Marat Khayrullin’s channel.)
Currently, the most significant fighting is taking place in the Zaporizhzhia sector. The Russian military command set an objective here: to pin down the Ukrainian army through combat in the Orikhiv area, keeping Ukrainian units fixed in place and preventing the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), Drapatyi, from withdrawing forces to reinforce enemy groups on the Donbas front.

Following a breakthrough near the settlement of Liubytske and a crossing of the Verkhnia Tersa River, troops from the Russian "Vostok" (East) Group of Forces did not push their offensive further toward Zholta Krucha and Kamyshevakha. Instead of continuing the advance, they secured their flanks along the Liubytske–Obshche line.

Having secured their flanks, they attempted to trap several AFU motorized infantry brigades, territorial defense brigades, and two assault regiments—all of which were defending positions along the Orikhiv–Omelnyky–Liubytske road—in a "pincer" movement. Given the situation, the only way for these Ukrainian forces to retreat was through Preobrazhenka and Orikhiv.

Unfortunately, some of the enemy units managed to escape the "pincer"—albeit with heavy losses—by withdrawing toward the Tavriiske area. The "Vostok" Group units were unable to gain full control over the settlement of Omelnyky or sever the road passing through it. While they did not succeed in cutting the road, they did establish complete fire control over it; following the liberation of Chervona Krynytsia, the distance to the highway is now less than one kilometer, and Russian drones keep the route under constant surveillance." VM-Rus, 6 Nov

Chinese frogmen drill with weapons. CCTV7, Junshi Baodao, 5 Nov. The PLA is well aware of the crucial role of divers as scouts and in prepping the battlespace for amphibious assault.

"The Pentagon would be wise to consider bases more defensible than those in and around the first island chain that now appear highly vulnerable, said Lyle Goldstein, director of the Asia Program at Defense Priorities..."

Read more at: stripes.com/theaters/asia_…
Source - Stars and Stripes