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@molfar_group

Ukraine's private intelligence firm. Open International Intelligence Institute. OSINT investigations, analytics & training.

t.me/molfar_global
Ukraine molfar.institute/en/ Joined November 2019
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Molfar Verified account @molfar_group
@molfar_agency
Consults businesses & research for you.
Teaches OSINT gov & biz. Online/offline.
Contact us via info@molfar.com

Volunteers: 1400+ investigations of war crimes.
Published in @nytimes, @guardian, @TheEconomist, @FT, @PBS.

molfar.com/en
molfar.com Private Intelligence Company | Molfar Intelligence Molfar Intelligence provides professional OSINT, due diligence, and threat intelligence. Get verified, actionable insights to support your global business decisions.
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Molfar Verified account @molfar_group
Minos analyzed media coverage of the humanitarian crisis in occupied Oleshky: 2,395 publications from 1,435 sources across 46 countries between August 25 and October 6, 2026.

The monitoring showed that the first wave of attention emerged on social media — a week before major media outlets picked up the story. Private individuals accounted for 72% of the publications.

At the same time, the focus of coverage shifted: the share of publications about drone deliveries of food increased from 6% to 28%.

Russian media and pro-war Telegram channels published 162 items promoting the narrative that Ukraine was responsible for the crisis. Minos also identified unofficial pages using the names CNN News and Al Jazeera English that published identical texts almost simultaneously.

This type of monitoring helps reveal where an information wave begins, how its content changes, and who is trying to influence public perception of events.

Minos applies this approach to analyzing the information landscape surrounding companies and institutions.

Read the full analysis: minoscore.com/blog/oleshky-i…

#Oleshky #Minos
Molfar Verified account @molfar_group
Our joint report with @CforCD : how a Crimean web studio became the technical backbone of Russia’s Pravda / Portal Kombat network and why it keeps running under sanctions.
Crimean IT company serving russian propaganda: the Center for Countering Disinformation and private intelligence company @molfar_group analyzed the activities of web studio TigerWeb and its links to the russian disinformation network Portal Kombat / Pravda.
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Molfar Verified account @molfar_group
Nuclear Experts, Alabuga, and Shahed Drones — Molfar Intelligence Institute Investigation

Molfar Intelligence Institute analysts investigated the activities of two scientists — Dmytro Shubnyakov and Said Darki. Both work in the field of nuclear technology and are linked to Alabuga, where Russia produces Shahed drones.

During periods of increased Russian-Iranian cooperation on the joint production of drones in Alabuga, these experts traveled between Russia and Iran.

Possible forms of payment for drone production technology include money, gold, and other property. This detail caught the analysts’ attention, as it may point to a possible exchange not only of resources but also of technology.

More details on the cooperation scheme, the people involved, and the links identified are available in the Molfar Intelligence Institute investigation: ​​molf.ar/46brZUP
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Molfar Verified account @molfar_group
Military Activity of Belarus and Russia on the Border with Ukraine: Molfar Intelligence Institute Analysis
Molfar Intelligence Institute analysts identified five sites in Russia’s Bryansk, Smolensk, and Oryol regions that may be used to store and launch Shahed drones. Some of them are located dozens of kilometers from the Belarusian border.

For the research, the analysts tracked device activity. The analysis shows changes in Belarus itself: over two years, the number of devices linked to Russian operators has almost halved, but the share of devices detected at military sites increased from 24.9% to 67.7%.

This may indicate an increased Russian military presence and the continued use of Belarusian territory for Russia’s military interests.

More details on the sites, routes to military facilities, and other findings are available in the Molfar Intelligence Institute article: molf.ar/4xcugv8