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₿/Quantum safe ❤️ /Jason❤️

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@quantum_safe

#Quantum and #Bitcoin enthusiast❤️Quantum Awareness ❤️ No quantum security, no future ❤️ No investment advice here❤️AI Creator ❤️Love peace and freedom❤️
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₿/Quantum safe ❤️ /Jason❤️ Verified account @quantum_safe
Next steps in preparing for post-quantum cryptography

Hash-based signatures
Hash-based signatures such as SLH-DSA, LMS and XMSS rely on different security assumptions than ML-DSA. They are not suitable for general purpose use as the signatures are large and the algorithms are much slower than ML-DSA. However, these algorithms may be a good fit for use cases such as signing firmware and software where speed is not a bottleneck.
For LMS and XMSS, the security of these algorithms critically depends on users correctly managing the state (that is, knowing which one-time keys have been used for signing so it can be guaranteed that they are never used again). Cases where state management is a more tractable problem include firmware and software signing. ETSI have created advice on how to do this in their Technical Report TR 103 692 v1.1.1. LMSand XMSS should only be used in situations where it is possible to manage state in a trusted manner for the lifetime of the signing key.
SLH-DSA provides a more robust alternative for situations where it may be difficult or impossible to guarantee a one-time key is not re-used, as state management is not straightforward and mistakes can be detrimental to security. This increased robustness comes with significantly larger signature sizes and greater signing time than either LMS or XMSS, although the verification performance is similar.

LINK: ncsc.gov.uk/paper/next-ste…