To figure out why Jensen Huang got ousted, just ask the question:
"What did Jensen refuse to do?"
"What did Jensen refuse to do?"
Ryan Shea
Verified account This account is verified. Learn more@ryaneshea
Building at the intersection of AI + bio. Fmr Senior Advisor @US_FDA. 10x unicorn investor. Cofounder @Stacks. MechE/CS @Princeton. NJ Math League State Champ.
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Here's Nvidia's board and their levels of skin in the game:
- 1/11 is Jensen Huang with 3.58%
- 4/11 have significant ownership (0.01% to 0.15%, few people in the company own more)
- 2/11 have moderate ownership (0.00075% to 0.0015%, comparable to the top thousand employees)
- 4/11 have low ownership (0.000007% to 0.0001%, which is less than that of several thousand employees)
- 1/11 is Jensen Huang with 3.58%
- 4/11 have significant ownership (0.01% to 0.15%, few people in the company own more)
- 2/11 have moderate ownership (0.00075% to 0.0015%, comparable to the top thousand employees)
- 4/11 have low ownership (0.000007% to 0.0001%, which is less than that of several thousand employees)
Conductor is shutting down and we put together a list of alternatives.
Here is a new and expanded list with over double the alternative products.
There's 43 in total, sorted by coverage of Conductor's core defining features:
Paradev, Tembo, Multica, Continuum, Agentastic, T3 Code, Traycer, Kcap, OpenHands, Orca, Warp, Replicas, Paperclip, Paseo, Orchestrator, Niteshift, Cloudroom, bb, Ghostex, Superconductor, Podium, AQ, Devin, Ellipsis, Synara, Emdash, Maestro, Boxes, CloudCLI, QM, Herdr, OpenClaw, Nimbalyst, Murmell, Capy, Rex, Supacode, Intent, OpenChamber, Sculptor, Darting, Vorflux, ArkenOS
Here is a new and expanded list with over double the alternative products.
There's 43 in total, sorted by coverage of Conductor's core defining features:
Paradev, Tembo, Multica, Continuum, Agentastic, T3 Code, Traycer, Kcap, OpenHands, Orca, Warp, Replicas, Paperclip, Paseo, Orchestrator, Niteshift, Cloudroom, bb, Ghostex, Superconductor, Podium, AQ, Devin, Ellipsis, Synara, Emdash, Maestro, Boxes, CloudCLI, QM, Herdr, OpenClaw, Nimbalyst, Murmell, Capy, Rex, Supacode, Intent, OpenChamber, Sculptor, Darting, Vorflux, ArkenOS
Conductor is shutting down and is the favored AI agent orchestrator for many teams.
In looking for a replacement, we put together a shortlist of Conductor alternatives.
Here is the list, compared across features, popularity, and agents supported.View quoted post on X
Conductor is shutting down and is the favored AI agent orchestrator for many teams.
In looking for a replacement, we put together a shortlist of Conductor alternatives.
Here is the list, compared across features, popularity, and agents supported.
In looking for a replacement, we put together a shortlist of Conductor alternatives.
Here is the list, compared across features, popularity, and agents supported.
I am very excited to share that Conductor is joining Meta!
We have some big, crazy plans for the next interface. If you liked Conductor, you’re gonna love what’s coming.
We’re super excited to work with @natfriedman and @alexandr_wang at MSL to build it. They’ve been on an absolute tear, and I’m convinced MSL has the highest talent density of all the labs.
A huge thank you to our earliest believers @aaron_epstein, @ilyasu, and @nabeel. And to everyone here who tried Conductor, sent us feedback, and prompt requests - you made this so much fun. Thank you ❤️🚂
Choo choo!View quoted post on X
PSA for macOS users:
1. Apple’s supplied SSL certificate bundle at /etc/ssl/cert.pem still trusts certificates attackers can forge using compromised eMudhra keys.
2. I confirmed this on macOS 26.7.1 and 27.0.1 using Apple’s built-in curl and Git.
3. An attacker intercepting connections from tools using this bundle could replace downloads with malware. With commands like curl … | sh, that malware would execute immediately.
4. Removing the roots that authorize those certificates blocks the tested chains. Both OS updates restored roots I’d previously removed, requiring me to remove them again.
4. I’ve submitted the findings to Apple’s security team and am awaiting their response. In the meantime, you can apply a temporary fix as outlined below.
5. To check and fix your machine, give an agent like ChatGPT/Codex or Claude Code the following prompt:
“Independently verify whether Apple’s /etc/ssl/cert.pem still permits trust in certificates signed with compromised eMudhra keys. If so, back it up and remove the roots enabling that trust, identified by verified SPKI fingerprints. Confirm Apple’s built-in curl and Git reject those chains while ordinary HTTPS still works. Preserve rollback and never disable TLS verification.”
Note that removing these roots can also block legitimate sites. This is a temporary mitigation, not a substitute for a fix from Apple.
I’ll share the script I used in a follow-up post if you’d prefer to use that directly.
1. Apple’s supplied SSL certificate bundle at /etc/ssl/cert.pem still trusts certificates attackers can forge using compromised eMudhra keys.
2. I confirmed this on macOS 26.7.1 and 27.0.1 using Apple’s built-in curl and Git.
3. An attacker intercepting connections from tools using this bundle could replace downloads with malware. With commands like curl … | sh, that malware would execute immediately.
4. Removing the roots that authorize those certificates blocks the tested chains. Both OS updates restored roots I’d previously removed, requiring me to remove them again.
4. I’ve submitted the findings to Apple’s security team and am awaiting their response. In the meantime, you can apply a temporary fix as outlined below.
5. To check and fix your machine, give an agent like ChatGPT/Codex or Claude Code the following prompt:
“Independently verify whether Apple’s /etc/ssl/cert.pem still permits trust in certificates signed with compromised eMudhra keys. If so, back it up and remove the roots enabling that trust, identified by verified SPKI fingerprints. Confirm Apple’s built-in curl and Git reject those chains while ordinary HTTPS still works. Preserve rollback and never disable TLS verification.”
Note that removing these roots can also block legitimate sites. This is a temporary mitigation, not a substitute for a fix from Apple.
I’ll share the script I used in a follow-up post if you’d prefer to use that directly.
PSA for Codex CLI users:View quoted post on X
1. Codex 0.163.0’s release lockfile pins rustls-webpki 0.103.15 and root bundles that can still trust compromised eMudhra certificates.
2. An attacker intercepting your connection could impersonate a server, steal sensitive data, or alter responses, potentially tricking Codex into running malicious commands.
3. Codex 0.164.0, released October 23 at 12:48 a.m. ET, updates those dependencies to fixed versions.
4. To check your codex version run "codex --version". It should be at least 0.164.0.
5. To patch the vulnerability, run "codex update".
6. Apps that bundle their own Codex copy must also be checked.