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Tomas Susanka

Verified account Trezor

@tsusanka

Prague Joined April 2012
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Tomas Susanka Verified account @tsusanka
Multiple entropy sources are only worth something if the code actually uses them. You can have four different sources of randomness in the device, but if it is using a test generator instead (code bug), none of those sources actually matter. Rolling dices doesn’t imply the device will actually use it. The entropy is not the problem here, the problem is the device not using it.

We already explained that Trezor does not use the affected code. Here are some examples of what we are already doing to make sure we do not accidentally bundle in testing RNG (random number generator):

👉 We do not use MicroPython's random module at all. It is disabled outright in our firmware config [1].

👉 rng_fill_buffer() reads the STM32 TRNG peripheral registers directly. No macro dispatch, no software path to fall through to [2].

👉 The software PRNG lives in a file literally named "crypto/rand_insecure.c", and compiling it emits "NOT SUITABLE FOR PRODUCTION USE!" warning [3].

👉 random.reseed() exists only under ifdef TREZOR_EMULATOR, and the C function behind it only under USE_INSECURE_PRNG. Two independent guards, and no reseed API in production firmware at all [4].

👉 rng_fill_buffer_strong() fills from the MCU TRNG, then XORs every byte with Optiga output (Safe 3, Safe 5) and, on Safe 7, Tropic output on top. If a secure element fails it returns false and the caller raises RuntimeError. Fail-closed, not fail-quiet on models with a secure element [5].

👉 Our Entropy check makes sure that the host’s (computer/phone) RNG is mixed in as an extra failsafe [6].

These are just some examples of how we protect from this kind of failure. That being said we never stop building and we always humbly learn from situations like these. So we are carefully studying what lessons can be learned from this incident and we are already drafting more safeguards on top [7].

You don’t have to trust me on this, our code is open-source and you can see for yourself or use your favorite AI model. See the links below. And don’t forget to ask your wallet if they can do the same…

[1] github.com/trezor/trezor-…

[2] github.com/trezor/trezor-…

[3] github.com/trezor/trezor-…

[4] github.com/trezor/trezor-…

[5] github.com/trezor/trezor-…

[6] trezor.io/learn/security…

[7] github.com/trezor/trezor-…
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Tomas Susanka Verified account @tsusanka
Randomness is the foundation everything else in a hardware wallet stands on. Get it wrong and nothing else matters. Not the secure element, not the air-gap, not the metal backup.

Weak entropy during initialization = funds drained "remotely." No device access needed, attacker just recomputes your keys. It's the single most critical path in a hardware wallet, and we treated it that way from the very first Trezor Model One (just turned 12 years old!) by mixing device entropy with entropy from the host (computer or phone). Never trust one source. We deliberately designed it this way from the very beginning.

The nightmare scenario is that test mode with weak randomness is shipped by accident. People think their wallet generated something truly random but it didn't. Anyone who knows the pattern can work backward and recreate their private keys and AI is definitely speeding this up. We run dedicated safeguards to make sure that can never happen in our builds.

Trezor Model One and Model T mixed two entropy sources together (from MCU and from the host). With Trezor Safe 3 we took this further and added Optiga as an independent entropy source. Safe 7 mixes four: MCU, host, Optiga, TROPIC01. On all models this results to 128-bit entropy in default settings. On top of that, we also introduced Entropy Check back in February 2025.

From a different angle: Let's finally retire the myth about air-gap. Air-gap doesn’t necessarily imply stronger security. With air-gapped wallets you miss this entropy from the host. If the randomness is not sufficient and keys are predictable, the attacker never needs to touch your hardware.
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Tomas Susanka Verified account @tsusanka
Silent Swap is a clipboard hijacker. It sits quietly in the background, spots when you copy a crypto address, and swaps in the hacker's address before you paste. So you think you're sending to a known contact but you're actually paying a hacker. It hides sneakily inside a fake 'Google Notes' browser extension and the attack itself is simple. It corrupts what your screen shows you at the moment you send.

This is why you can't fully trust a device that connects to the internet. Your computer can be compromised without you knowing, and the malware doesn't even need your keys, it just needs to control what you see. A hardware wallet is never connected to the internet. The real destination address appears on the hardware wallet's own screen, so if it's been swapped, you can see the mismatch and catch it before you confirm.

But it only works if you check. The hardware wallet gives you the chance to catch this, it doesn't remove your part in catching it. Read the full address on the hardware wallet's screen before you approve, don't just glance and click. And the basics still apply to everyone. Never install cracked software, and treat unfamiliar browser extensions with suspicion.
U.Today Verified account @Utoday_en Jul 1
🚨 WARNING: A highly sophisticated new crypto malware dubbed "Silent Swap" is targeting holders of $BTC, $​ETH, and $​XRP! dlvr.it/TTJdDx
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