kz.upside
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ex-HRTer, now building the venue I always wanted to trade on
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When short selling is restricted, access to a bank’s inventory and synthetic shorts becomes valuable. Institutional clients pay for that access.
Perps could open up the other side of that trade. If demand to short pushes funding negative, shorts pay the longs willing to take the exposure. That payment can attract more capital to meet the demand.
You shouldn’t need an account at a top-tier investment bank to participate in those economics. Funding makes the price of providing that capital visible, and accessible to a much wider market.
Go @upside_max !
Perps could open up the other side of that trade. If demand to short pushes funding negative, shorts pay the longs willing to take the exposure. That payment can attract more capital to meet the demand.
You shouldn’t need an account at a top-tier investment bank to participate in those economics. Funding makes the price of providing that capital visible, and accessible to a much wider market.
Go @upside_max !
Interesting paper! And it points to two central questions in market making: what’s fair value, and how certain are you about it?
In the model, the other side knows the true value. They buy when your offer is too cheap, sell when your bid is too high, and otherwise do nothing. Your estimate can be right on average while the trades you actually receive lose money.
The spread gives you room for estimation error. Quote too tightly and you’re vulnerable to better-informed flow. Quote too widely and you lose trading opportunities.
Here’s a game to think about:
A player draws a number uniformly between 0 and 1. They can keep it or discard it and redraw, up to two more times. Each redraw replaces the previous number. The product pays the final number.
Before any draws happen, make a two-sided market on that payout.
Now give the player 100 redraws. How does your fair value change? Would you quote tighter or wider?
What if they have unlimited redraws?
In the model, the other side knows the true value. They buy when your offer is too cheap, sell when your bid is too high, and otherwise do nothing. Your estimate can be right on average while the trades you actually receive lose money.
The spread gives you room for estimation error. Quote too tightly and you’re vulnerable to better-informed flow. Quote too widely and you lose trading opportunities.
Here’s a game to think about:
A player draws a number uniformly between 0 and 1. They can keep it or discard it and redraw, up to two more times. Each redraw replaces the previous number. The product pays the final number.
Before any draws happen, make a two-sided market on that payout.
Now give the player 100 redraws. How does your fair value change? Would you quote tighter or wider?
What if they have unlimited redraws?
Jane Street paid its people $2.68 MILLION each on average last year.View quoted post on X
To get in, you face one question with no right answer: "make me a market."
The other side only trades with you when you're WRONG.
This f*cking formula shows why even the smartest guess loses money.
I ran the math. You think it's worth $100. You're usually off by about $1.
Quote 100 / 100 - they trade every time. You lose 80 cents a quote.
Quote 99 / 101 - they hit you 1 time in 3. You lose 17 cents.
Quote 98 / 102 - 1 time in 22. But no real customer trades that wide.
Same guess. Different width. Different fate.
No spread costs you 0.8 × how wrong you usually are.
Your spread isn't a price. It's how much you admit you don't know.
Make me a market: how many piano tuners work in Chicago? Bid and ask.
The full paper is below. Bookmark before it's buried.
This is a concrete example of the point I made yesterday: shared trading infrastructure becomes more useful when it can support different market designs.
Hooks let pools adapt pricing, fees and liquidity rules to the assets they trade and the conditions they face. A stablecoin pool and a volatile token pool have good reasons to behave differently.
Builders can reuse the infrastructure and compete on those decisions. As the experiments attract real flow, we get to learn which rules produce better execution and more sustainable liquidity.
Go @upside_max !
Hooks let pools adapt pricing, fees and liquidity rules to the assets they trade and the conditions they face. A stablecoin pool and a volatile token pool have good reasons to behave differently.
Builders can reuse the infrastructure and compete on those decisions. As the experiments attract real flow, we get to learn which rules produce better execution and more sustainable liquidity.
Go @upside_max !
5) One for the builders: hooks are undergoing exponential growthView quoted post on X
Since the launch of v4, they've gone from 0 to 11% of protocol volume, more more being deployed every day
I think the bigger question is how many different market structures a trading chain can support.
A retail perp venue, an institutional futures market and a spot exchange serve different users. Their requirements for access, privacy, matching and liquidation management will differ. Sharing infrastructure shouldn’t mean inheriting the entire rulebook of the first exchange built on it.
That’s what makes the extra effort to enter the US interesting. It’s one of the most complex market structures to accommodate: exchanges, clearinghouses and brokers have distinct responsibilities, and the technology has to work within those relationships. That tests much more than whether the chain can process orders quickly.
If Hyperliquid can accommodate those business and regulation requirements, it demonstrates something valuable: operators can build substantially different trading businesses on the same infrastructure. The commercial opportunity expands from attracting traders to attracting venues, brokers and distribution partners.
The benefit is that each operator can reuse the trading infrastructure and focus on the decisions that differentiate its market: attracting liquidity, using capital efficiently and managing liquidations. Improvements to the shared infrastructure can benefit multiple venues, while each retains the rules suited to its customers.
That’s the opportunity I see for us @upside_max too: use shared infrastructure to build the market structure we think traders need. A trading chain becomes much more useful when its growth can come from supporting different exchange designs.
A retail perp venue, an institutional futures market and a spot exchange serve different users. Their requirements for access, privacy, matching and liquidation management will differ. Sharing infrastructure shouldn’t mean inheriting the entire rulebook of the first exchange built on it.
That’s what makes the extra effort to enter the US interesting. It’s one of the most complex market structures to accommodate: exchanges, clearinghouses and brokers have distinct responsibilities, and the technology has to work within those relationships. That tests much more than whether the chain can process orders quickly.
If Hyperliquid can accommodate those business and regulation requirements, it demonstrates something valuable: operators can build substantially different trading businesses on the same infrastructure. The commercial opportunity expands from attracting traders to attracting venues, brokers and distribution partners.
The benefit is that each operator can reuse the trading infrastructure and focus on the decisions that differentiate its market: attracting liquidity, using capital efficiently and managing liquidations. Improvements to the shared infrastructure can benefit multiple venues, while each retains the rules suited to its customers.
That’s the opportunity I see for us @upside_max too: use shared infrastructure to build the market structure we think traders need. A trading chain becomes much more useful when its growth can come from supporting different exchange designs.
Ok, following up on this in thread form this time...I really appreciate the thoughtful responses to my questions about Hyperliquid. For the record, I am long $HYPE and am a big fan of what the team has accomplished. Not doesn't mean it will translate smoothly onshore.View quoted post on X
One thing I forgot to mention (which was brought up in the responses) - will the CFTC permit ADL to exist on a regulated exchange? I suspect the answer is no, but we will see. If not, what are the ramifications? I have briefly mentioned ADL in the past: x.com/drwconvexity/s…
ADL inverts the clearing house liquidation waterfall in a default scenario and will be viewed as untenable by any institution.