Esfandyar Batmanghelidj

I share my opinions and analysis here in the hopes that they can be useful, in some small way, for people forming their own opinions or seeking to understand the situation in Iran.

When I started this account years ago, most people who followed me either knew me or my work. They didn’t have to wonder about my motivations. But that’s not the case for many people seeing my tweets today. Understandably, without any context, people might wonder about my “priors” and whether my opinions and analysis are presented in good faith. They might make assumptions about my politics or place me in a certain camp, especially in view of the polarized debate on Iran.

I’ll admit I don’t fully understand the motivations of a lot of people posting here. We are debating and discussing through tweets what would have in an earlier time been examined through essays and books, where the author could situate their argument more fully. This is also why I have begun to post longer tweets—hot takes don’t help in moments like this.

If you have any questions about my motivations, feel free to ask (you can reply to this tweet, for example). Explaining why we hold certain positions is a really important part of having a healthy political discourse and I believe this process of explication should be a bigger part of our engagement with the question of what Iran’s future should look like. Authenticity matters.

Good report from @ErikaSolomon and colleagues on why enforcing a “land blockade” to suffocate the Iranian economy probably won’t work—regional countries have their own dependencies on Iran and don’t agree with the blockade’s aims.

Gift link:
nytimes.com/2026/11/11/wor…

Back in 2022, I reviewed @IsabellaMWeber and @njtmulder's seminal books for @WarOnTheRocks.

I was thinking about the lessons of the pandemic and the global disruption caused by the Russia sanctions. Looking back, the conclusion has held up, especially as the world continues to adjust to the Iran war.

"It is likely that the expanded use of sanctions will spur countries to pursue models of economic development that increase friction for the global economy. These moves might be conspicuous, such as when countries pursue policies ranging from protectionism to autarky. But they could also be more subtle. China is an outlier in the global economy because its embrace of markets was circumscribed. Chinese policymakers realized that to win their own economic war — the battle for development — the iron fist needed to guide the invisible hand. Other states may come to that same conclusion, particularly if China fares better than more marketized economies at weathering the coming storm."
warontherocks.com/is-the-west-la…

If the Trump admin steps back from fighting and instead decides to tighten the blockade and further increase economic pressure, Iran could use military escalation to raise costs.

But there's an alternative.

It's also possible that regional countries, which can't tolerate more instability, will quietly support the Iranian economy, including by breaking the blockade.

This is approach they have adopted since June. It has worked for around 6 months, it may work for another 24.

The war and blockade have had a significant negative impact on the Iranian economy, but the impact on economic output has been smaller than most people realize.

After six months of war, the decline in Iran's non-oil economic output was smaller than the impact of the pandemic on US economy activity after the same period.

The decline was also only about *one-seventh* of the contraction seen in Ukrainian economic output within six months of the Russian invasion.

Iran's economy is not on the verge of collapse, it is simply experiencing a deep recession caused by an external shock.

From our latest research note:
bourseandbazaar-substack.org/p/what-is-the-…