Dr. Zuler (@zuler)

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Did you know @MeteoraAG lost $1.5M to an OTC scammer this quarter?

reading the $MET Q1 report so you don't have to👀

>Cash outflows were $7M total.

>$4.2M ops. Within the quarterly run-rate.

>BUT $1.5M gone trying to buy back their own token. scammed on OTC.

A police report has been filed. Not sure how to feel about this, I appreciate the transparency, not a lot of teams would have pointed this out.

Dr. Zuler @zuler 1d

Where’s the Polymarket about who @bubblemaps is going to expose

Dr. Zuler @zuler 1d

can confirm Sahil spends his life DMing every single KOL like this

Ansem 🐂🀄️ Verified account @blknoiz06 1d

just to clarify since i guess i need to, no i have never done anything with sahil, he is a scammer and ive been calling him a scammer since the very beginning, he lied about partnering with me back then and he is doing it again now

also bro i dont text like that, look at the capitalization of the words, & "Brb doing some errands" @ 1:20am? cmon man you're smarter than this

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Dr. Zuler @zuler 2d

genuinely thought CZ was acting in good faith when he called out the Solana Shanghai event?

he might have been the first person to report it

DEGEN NEWS Verified account @DegenerateNews 2d

NEW: CHINA'S CENTRAL BANK SAYS IT HALTED @solana'S SHANGHAI EVENT BEFORE IT STARTED AND WILL INVESTIGATE THOSE INVOLVED

A PBOC OFFICIAL SAID SOLANA USED DOMESTIC ENTITIES TO RUN LUJIAZUI ADS AS VIRTUAL-CURRENCY MARKETING

SOURCE: mp.weixin.qq.com/s/sctCBtyVWQK6…

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Dr. Zuler @zuler 2d

Update on @Loopscale exploit:

the attacker used two different tricks

1. The SOL vault thought the attacker's collateral was worth much more than it really was. That wrong valuation let them borrow about $412K without putting up enough real backing.

2. They then put a loan with an extreme interest rate into the USDC vault. The vault counted that loan as being worth far more, making its balance look bigger than it was. The attacker tried to withdraw about $521K against that inflated value, but Loopscale stopped it within 30 seconds.

In plain English: bad pricing enabled the first loan. Bad loan accounting nearly enabled the second withdrawal.

> Loopscale says both methods are now contained and users won't lose their deposits
> adding collateral and repaying most loans is working again
> vault withdrawals are still paused

Still waiting for the full post-mortem and full withdrawals.

Loopscale @Loopscale 2d

Update: Priority loan functionality has now been restored across the platform.
• Collateral-top ups are available for all loans
• Repayments are available for all loans except those funded by the USDC Genesis Vault
• Borrowers who fully repay loans can withdraw their collateral. Collateral withdrawals remain temporarily disabled for loans funded by the USDC Genesis Vault.

Vault withdrawals and all other protocol functionality remain restricted out of an abundance of caution. Our team and partners are working to ensure a safe restoration of full functionality as quickly as possible.

We have identified and contained the two paths used during this incident. Both paths involved sophisticated, multi-step transactions targeting publicly inspectable program logic and private transaction-building APIs. The attacker first targeted the SOL Genesis Vault using a misconfigured combination of asset-pricing parameters that caused deposited collateral to be valued as a different asset, enabling an undercollateralized loan of approximately $412K. They later used an atomic transaction bundle to sell a loan carrying an extreme interest rate into the USDC Genesis Vault, inflating its NAV and enabling a disproportionate redemption of approximately $521K which our systems halted within 30 seconds of transaction generation. No user deposits will incur a loss.

We will share further updates from this account as our investigation progresses and additional functionality is safely restored.
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Dr. Zuler

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