Twitxy Saved

Lyle Morris

Verified account This account is verified. Learn more

@LyleJMorris

Senior Fellow for Foreign Policy and National Security at @AsiaPolicy’s Center for China Analysis. Previous @DeptofWar; @RANDCorporation; @NBRNews; @CSIS.
Washington, D.C. lylejmorris.com Joined December 2010
2.1K Following 21K Followers 8.4K Posts

Latest posts 5

Pinned post

Lyle Morris Verified account @LyleJMorris
Pleased to share my latest @AsiaPolicy report, "The Factors That Matter: A Formula for Understanding China’s Use of Force Calculus Over Taiwan."
The purpose is to put myself in Xi's shoes to understand China’s calculus for whether to use military force to "reunify" Taiwan. It introduces a formula for understanding the macro-level internal and external factors that China and Xi Jinping will likely consider, divided into two categories: internal and external factors. Internal factors are variables within China’s control and deal primarily with Chinese military capabilities, domestic political and economic stability, and leader legacy. External factors include variables largely, but not completely, outside the control of China and China’s leaders—namely, the role of Taiwan and its identity vis-à-vis mainland China, the role of the United States and its allies and partners, and the military capabilities of the Taiwanese military. The intent is not to offer an exhaustive or comprehensive list of all factors that matter, but rather to explore the factors of most consequence to China. The factors identified here are intended to be time and leader-agnostic—meaning they should stand the test of time irrespective of which leader is in charge in China (or the United States and Taiwan, for that matter).

My main takeaway is that a Chinese decision to invade Taiwan would not be driven by a single trigger, but by the interaction of multiple internal and external variables. Internally, Beijing would weigh the PLA’s military readiness, China's domestic stability, and Xi Jinping's political legacy and strategic objectives. Externally, Chinese leaders would assess Taiwan's perceived trajectory toward permanent separation, the broader international environment, the likelihood of U.S. military intervention, the willingness of U.S. allies and partners to respond, and Taiwan's own deterrent capabilities.

The good news is that these factors have not coalesced in such a way to prompt Xi to decide to invade. But 2028 remains a key inflection point, with presidential elections in Taiwan and the United States.

asiasociety.org/policy-institu…
6 replies 30 reposts 58 likes 8.9K views View on X
Lyle Morris Verified account @LyleJMorris
warontherocks.com The Blind Spots in Chinese Military Studies During a recent conference on the People’s Liberation Army, I heard the same question posed to attendees and paper writers: “How would China react to U.S.
Morrisan15 @morris_que14 3d
The myth that the PLA operates in a culture of secrecy is almost complete BS. The reason this myth persists is because the people who analyse the PLA in the West don't know Chinese. The actual PLA is a very 'loud' institution where officers are brash about their ideas
View quoted post on X
5 replies 6 reposts 46 likes 4.7K views View on X
Lyle Morris Verified account @LyleJMorris
Not a good sign that 2 PRC nationals went across the Strait in a rubber boat, landed near Taipei undetected, and moseyed around Taiwan for a WEEK before being caught.
TaiwanPlus News Verified account @taiwanplusnews 2d
Two Chinese nationals have been sentenced to nine and six months in prison after authorities said they crossed from China’s Fujian Province to Taiwan in a rubber boat. The men allegedly traveled around Taiwan for about a week before being caught. Taiwan’s coast guard apologized for the security lapse.
View quoted post on X
4 replies 5 reposts 35 likes 4.3K views View on X
Lyle Morris Verified account @LyleJMorris
Joshua Arostegui and the China Landpower Studies Center (CLSC) have started a new translation series of PLA authoritative writings. In their first issue, Josh highlights an article in Military Art on how PLA tactical political organs sustain combat power in brigade offensives.

This translation underscores what most of us in the PLA watching community have known for a while: political work/commissar officers are no longer the "Party guys" with no operational experience. They are deeply enmeshed in operational units and are expected to contribute to combat effectiveness.

@KyleMarcrum

army.edu/News/View/Arti…
2 replies 41 reposts 128 likes 15K views View on X
Lyle Morris Verified account @LyleJMorris
Interested in contributing to @AsiaPolicy's Center for China Analysis' work on the PLA, cross-Straits and Chinese foreign policy? If so, come work for me!

I am hiring an intern for the Winter/Spring in Washington, DC. Fluency in Mandarin a must.

asiasociety.org/policy-institu…
asiasociety.org Winter/Spring Intern, ASPI Center for China Analysis (Foreign Policy and National Security) Winter/Spring Intern, ASPI Center for China Analysis (Foreign Policy and National Security)