Maggie Michael

Basha باشا Verified account @BashaReport · Oct 29

Abdulrahman Al-Rashed’s Stark Warnings on the Houthis, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia’s War

Veteran Saudi journalist and political commentator Abdulrahman Al-Rashed @aalrashed, former general manager of @AlArabiya and former editor-in-chief of @aawsat_News, delivered a series of warnings about the war in Yemen, the Houthis' growing military capabilities, Iranian involvement, and the challenges facing Saudi Arabia.

Speaking with Omar Al-Jeraisy @Ojeraisy on the Socrates podcast, published by @thmanyah, Al-Rashed described the conflict as potentially the most dangerous security crisis in Saudi Arabia's history.

His remarks challenged assumptions about the Houthis' military weakness, questioned the ability of Yemen's divided anti-Houthi forces to defeat them, and warned Saudi audiences against expecting a quick end to the fighting. He also acknowledged that Iran had used the years of relative calm to help the Houthis build an extensive military infrastructure.

Below are ten of his key remarks on the challenges facing Saudi Arabia and the future of the war in Yemen.

1) Saudi Arabia Faces Its Most Dangerous Crisis Since Its Founding

Al-Rashed warned that Saudi Arabia faces simultaneous threats from Iran, Iraqi militias, and the Houthis, describing the current situation as more dangerous than the military threat posed by Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War.

"The Kingdom today faces the most dangerous crisis in its history since the founding of Saudi Arabia. Perhaps people do not realize how serious this danger is. Even when Saddam invaded Kuwait and positioned nearly half a million soldiers on our borders, it was not as dangerous as what we face today. Iran threatens us, the enormous militias in Iraq threaten us from the north, and the Houthis threaten us from Yemen in the south. We have three open fronts."

2) Iran Used the Ceasefire to Build the Houthis' Military Capabilities

One of Al-Rashed's most significant admissions concerned Saudi Arabia's failure to anticipate the scale of Iranian military assistance to the Houthis during the period of relative calm.

"The one thing we failed to read correctly was that, from the signing of the agreement until yesterday, Iran was working inside Houthi-controlled territory to build enormous offensive military capabilities. Thousands of missiles and drones, factories, assembly facilities, tunnels, and everything else. All of this was built during the period of truce and reconciliation."

3) Abdulmalik Al-Houthi Has Become an Iranian Proxy

Al-Rashed argued that the Houthi leadership had squandered opportunities to secure political recognition and govern Yemen, choosing instead to subordinate its military decisions to Tehran.

"In the end, he turned himself into an Iranian instrument. Having relations with Iran is not the problem. But when Iran tells you, 'I am going to close the Strait of Hormuz,' and two months later you close Bab al-Mandab, or 'I am going to fight Saudi Arabia,' and you attack it from the south, then you have become a proxy. That is the difference between an ally and a proxy."

4) Underestimating Houthi Fighters Is a Serious Military Mistake

Despite his opposition to the Houthis, Al-Rashed acknowledged their combat effectiveness, ideological commitment, and willingness to sustain casualties. He cautioned against dismissing them as poorly equipped irregular fighters.

"All the field information, and everyone who has followed the Houthis and their military history, acknowledges that the Houthis are a powerful fighting group. They are very tough fighters. They lead the battles, and they are the ones who die in those battles. You see them walking in sandals with RPGs on their shoulders, going up and down mountains. These are genuinely very dangerous fighters."

5) The Houthis Know How to Fight but Cannot Build a State

Al-Rashed compared the movement's ideological foundations and military behavior to jihadist organizations. He argued that the Houthis' ability to fight prolonged wars should not be confused with an ability to govern Yemen.

"They resemble Al-Qaeda. In the end, they resemble jihadist groups. If you examine their project and listen to their literature, that is what you find. Like other jihadist forces, they eventually lose their momentum and military capabilities. They cannot build a state. That is their fundamental weakness. They do not have the ability to become a state."

6) Yemen's Anti-Houthi Forces Are Undermined by Their Own Divisions

Al-Rashed acknowledged that Yemen's internationally recognized government and its affiliated military formations continue to struggle with rival leadership structures, political competition, and the absence of unified decision-making.

"I agree that there is a problem among our Yemeni brothers. They fight over power, they fight over decision-making, and they have different views about how things should be managed. In a state, there is a hierarchy, a strategy, a decision-maker, and people who follow that decision. Everyone is supposed to work toward their common interest. They can argue afterward if they want."

7) Without Yemen's Legitimate Government, Saudi Arabia Loses Its Legal Basis for Military Intervention

Responding to criticism of Yemen's political leadership, Al-Rashed defended the internationally recognized government's importance to Saudi Arabia, arguing that its legitimacy provides an essential legal foundation for military operations.

"It is also a mistake to underestimate the value of the legitimate government from a legal perspective. Without that legitimacy, our presence in Yemen would become illegal. Saudi Arabia cannot send a single soldier across the border without legitimacy, because it would be condemned by the United Nations and the major powers. You need that legitimacy."

8) Southern Yemeni Factions Are Mistaken if They Think the Houthis Will Spare Them

Addressing Yemen's southern political movements, Al-Rashed warned that factions seeking accommodation with the Houthis to advance their own political ambitions risk becoming their next targets.

"Why would you enter a military conflict and try to ally yourself with, or court, the Houthis in the hope that they will give you that opportunity? This is a kind of political stupidity. The Houthis will swallow you. They are not even satisfied with the north. If they were satisfied with the north, we would have established relations with them, opened our borders, traded with them, and exchanged embassies. They did not do that with us. Why would they do it with you?"

9) The War Threatens Saudi Arabia's Economic Ambitions

Al-Rashed acknowledged that the conflict could disrupt major Saudi economic projects, commercial activity, and development plans. He stressed that the Kingdom must continue functioning economically while recognizing the possibility of further disruption.

"Construction is continuing, institutions are completing their projects, and activities are continuing. I am not saying life is 100 percent normal. That is not true. But things are moving, and there is an effort not to allow this war, which has been imposed on us, to stop our economic activities. Could the war cause projects to stop? Of course, that is possible."

10) The War Could Last One or Two Years, Not Ten Days

Al-Rashed closed one of his strongest warnings by criticizing commentators who portray the ongoing conflict as an easy military campaign. He urged Saudi audiences to understand the scale of the danger and prepare psychologically for a prolonged war.

"We must understand that we face a major danger, deal with it psychologically, and accept its consequences. It is wrong to think the war will end in ten days. Those who say it will end in two months, God willing it ends in the coming days, but it could last a year, perhaps two years. It is wrong to give people the impression that everything is easy and that the matter is finished. This is a war, not a football match."

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