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Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش

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@citrinowicz

Middle East, National Security and intelligence
expert
خبير لشؤون الشرق الأوسط وإيران
Senior Fellow @inss_hebrew
Nonresident Fellow @AtlanticCouncil
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Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش Verified account @citrinowicz
Before Striking Iran: Defining Achievable and realistic Objectives

Before considering a military strike against Iran, it is essential to be realistic about what such a campaign can actually accomplish.
There is little doubt that Iran is not a peer competitor to the United States militarily. The U.S. retains overwhelming conventional superiority and operational dominance across domains. However, Iran should not be underestimated. As demonstrated in previous limited confrontations, particularly in missile warfare, Tehran possesses meaningful asymmetric capabilities — especially in its ballistic missile arsenal and regional proxy network.
The core question, therefore, is not whether the United States can inflict damage. It is: What strategic objective is realistically achievable?

1. Regime Change
Even senior U.S. officials have acknowledged that regime change would be extraordinarily difficult to achieve.
There is no unified, viable opposition inside Iran capable of stepping in and governing. Moreover, regime change would almost certainly require a prolonged campaign, potentially including ground forces — something the American public and policymakers have shown little appetite for after Iraq and Afghanistan.
Absent a willingness to commit to a large-scale, long-term stabilization effort, regime change is not a credible objective.

2. Destabilizing the Regime to Trigger Internal Uprising
A military campaign could weaken the regime and create internal pressure. However, Iran’s leadership — particularly the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) — has no exit option. The regime’s survival is existential for its core leadership.
History suggests they would respond to internal unrest with overwhelming force. For destabilization to translate into meaningful political change, a sustained and prolonged campaign would likely be required. Even then, the most probable outcome may not be democratic transition, but internal chaos — potentially pushing Iran toward civil conflict.
That scenario carries significant regional and global risks.

3. Destroying Iran’s Nuclear Program
A military strike could significantly damage nuclear facilities. Precision strikes may delay progress and degrade infrastructure.
But strikes cannot eliminate scientific knowledge, human capital, or political will. Nor is it certain that all highly enriched material could be located and destroyed.
At best, military action may delay the program. It is unlikely to eliminate it permanently. Iran would almost certainly attempt reconstruction — potentially with greater determination and fewer constraints.

4. Eliminating Iran’s Missile Capabilities
A broad campaign could substantially degrade Iran’s missile inventory and production infrastructure.
However, Iran’s missile program is domestically based and central to its defense doctrine. It is viewed as a pillar of deterrence against superior conventional forces. Even after heavy losses, Tehran would likely prioritize rebuilding these capabilities.
The result may be temporary degradation rather than permanent removal.

5. Forcing Iran Back to Negotiations on Better Terms
There is an assumption that military pressure could coerce Tehran into accepting a more favorable agreement.
Yet past confrontations suggest that the Iranian leadership may choose endurance over capitulation. The regime may calculate that time increases political pressure on Washington to de-escalate, particularly if the conflict becomes prolonged or regionally destabilizing.
Rather than producing immediate concessions, military action could harden Iran’s negotiating position — or eliminate diplomatic channels entirely.

6. Targeting Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei
Some might argue that removing the Supreme Leader could fundamentally alter Iran’s trajectory.
However, decapitation strikes often produce unpredictable outcomes. Iran’s political system is institutionalized, not purely personalist. Removing Khamenei could trigger retaliation from Iran and its regional proxies and potentially force the United States into a much broader conflict.
It is also unclear whether such a move would moderate Iranian policy. It could just as easily radicalize it.

The Strategic Bottom Line
There is no question about U.S. military superiority in a direct confrontation. The real issue is strategic clarity.
For the first time in decades, the possibility of direct U.S.–Iran military confrontation raises the prospect of open interstate war rather than proxy conflict. That demands disciplined thinking about ends, ways, and means.
No available objective appears easily attainable. All carry significant second- and third-order effects. Many outcomes could be unpredictable — and not necessarily favorable to U.S. interests.

Thus, before initiating military action, policymakers must clearly define what “success” looks like — and whether the likely costs, duration, escalation risks, and regional consequences align with America’s broader strategic priorities.
Military capability is not the same as strategic advantage.

#IranRevolution2026
#Iran
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Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش Verified account @citrinowicz
In today’s @nytimes ,I discussed an important but often overlooked aspect of Iran’s military doctrine: the extraordinary efforts Tehran has made over decades to ensure the survival of its missile program, even under sustained military attack.

Iran’s missile infrastructure was never designed for a short confrontation. It was built to withstand prolonged wars, extensive airstrikes, and severe damage to critical national infrastructure.

This is why Tehran has invested heavily in underground facilities, redundancy, decentralization, and potentially independent water and electricity supplies to keep its missile operations functioning even when civilian infrastructure is disrupted.

While the direct connection between Iran’s dam projects and its underground missile facilities has not been conclusively established, such an approach would be entirely consistent with Iran’s strategic thinking.

Iran’s missile program is not simply a collection of launchers and production facilities that can be eliminated through airstrikes. It is a deeply embedded strategic capability, developed over decades with survival and resilience at its core.

Military operations can degrade Iran’s missile capabilities. But degrading them is not the same as eliminating them.

@SanamMahoozi
@ErikaSolomon

nytimes.com/2026/11/16/wor…
www.nytimes.com Airstrikes on Iran Missile Sites May Shed Light on Justification for Dams Environmentalists have long puzzled over a wide network of water projects lacking any obvious justification. Then their areas were targeted in airstrikes.
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Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش Verified account @citrinowicz
Another important variable in Tehran's calculations is the incoming U.S. Congress.

Iranian leaders may believe that time is working in their favor, particularly in light of statements by some senior Democrats calling for an end to the war and restrictions on its funding.

From Tehran's perspective, there may be little incentive to escalate now if the political pressure on President Trump to end the conflict is expected to intensify once the new Congress takes office in January.

This could help explain Iran's determination to respond to every attack and continue targeting oil tankers, but not pursuing further escalation. Just preserving the deterrence equasion.

Whether that assessment proves correct is another matter. Congressional opposition does not automatically translate into an ability to end a war, and much will depend on the balance of power on Capitol Hill. But what matters is not only the political reality in Washington, it is how that reality is perceived in Tehran.
Hamidreza Azizi Verified account @HamidRezaAz 4h
Iran-US Confrontation: Fragile Deterrence and Three Scenarios for Renewed War

🔹The USS Theodore Roosevelt has reportedly entered CENTCOM’s area of operations, joining two other U.S. aircraft carriers already in the region. It remains unclear whether Washington intends to maintain all three carriers or replace one of the existing deployments. Either way, the U.S. military now has greater operational capacity to conduct strikes against #Iran.

🔹This comes amid continued U.S. reconnaissance flights near Iran’s southern coast, military logistics operations toward the region, and sporadic exchanges of fire. U.S. has conducted strikes against radar and military installations in southern Iran, while Tehran has claimed attacks against American facilities in Bahrain. The latter is particularly significant, as it marks a resumption of Iranian attacks against U.S. military facilities in neighboring Arab countries after a roughly two-month pause.

🔹On the diplomatic front, there are no clear signs of a breakthrough. Despite Qatar’s intensified mediation efforts and its prime minister’s meetings with Trump and Vance last week, fundamental disagreements between Washington and Tehran remain unresolved. The latest military exchanges have further complicated prospects for a negotiated settlement.

🔹The important point here is that what appears to be preventing another large-scale war is primarily a political calculation in Washington regarding its objectives, potential gains, and consequences, rather than a lack of military capability.

🔹Some Iranian analysts and strategists describe the current situation as one of “partial deterrence” or “unstable deterrence.” The argument is that Iran has managed to establish a certain level of deterrence against the U.S., but that this remains fragile and could break down at any moment.

🔹Against this backdrop, three scenarios are being discussed within Iran’s strategic community:

1. Renewed U.S. military campaign: Once Washington completes its military preparations, Trump may decide to resume large-scale operations. One of the ongoing limited confrontations along Iran’s southern coast could provide the immediate trigger or justification.

2. Major Israeli covert operation: Another possibility, reportedly also under consideration in Israel, is a significant covert operation inside Iran aimed at provoking an Iranian military response. If Tehran retaliates against Israeli or American targets, that could provide the justification for renewed war, while shifting responsibility for escalation onto Iran.

3. Prolonged economic and military pressure: Under this scenario, Washington would maintain or intensify the naval blockade, continue building up its military presence, and avoid another full-scale war. The objective would be to gradually weaken Iran economically, hoping that mounting domestic pressure would either destabilize the country or force Tehran into concessions.

🔹Some Iranian analysts also believe this third approach could involve continued, limited covert attacks against energy facilities and other critical infrastructure to maximize the impact of the sanctions.

🔹There is a growing perception in Tehran that the third scenario is Trump's preferred option, partly because such a strategy would likely face little serious opposition from Democrats.

🔹But this is also creating a different calculation on the Iranian side. An increasingly prominent argument is that all three scenarios could ultimately lead to the same outcome for Iran: a gradual weakening of the country’s military, economic, and political position. From this perspective, continuing to exercise restraint may only make Iran more vulnerable over time.

🔹This helps explain the significance of Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi’s remarks on state television yesterday. By arguing that the war is still ongoing and that Iran retains the right to respond, he appears to be establishing a legal and political justification for possible further Iranian action.

🔹Overall, the current equilibrium appears increasingly difficult to sustain. Washington may still prefer to avoid another major military campaign, but Tehran could eventually conclude that breaking the blockade through escalation is less costly than accepting its continuation.

🔹In other words, the risk of renewed war no longer depends solely on whether Trump decides to attack Iran again. It also depends on whether Tehran concludes that the costs of continued restraint have become greater than the risks of escalation.
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Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش Verified account @citrinowicz
Iran After the War: A Stronger IRGC, a Weaker Clergy—and a New Domestic Bargain?

One of the most consequential questions surrounding Iran's postwar future is not just who will hold power in Tehran, but how that power will be exercised at home.

We may be looking at a fundamentally different Iran—one in which the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has emerged stronger, while the traditional clerical establishment has grown weaker. Once the war ends, the regime's attention will inevitably turn inward, toward domestic challenges that have largely been pushed aside during the conflict.

This raises fundamental questions that remain unanswered. Could the growing dominance of the IRGC, coupled with the declining influence of the clergy, lead to a relaxation of religious restrictions? Not because Iran is moving toward democracy, it is not, but because the regime may conclude that easing certain social restrictions is a useful price to pay for greater political stability.

This calculation could become even more pressing as economic hardship, public frustration, and the consequences of war increase the risk of domestic unrest. A more militarized Iranian regime could become somewhat less religiously restrictive without becoming any less authoritarian. In fact, selective social concessions could become another instrument for preserving its grip on power.

Such a shift would not necessarily translate into greater flexibility toward the United States or the West. Tehran could maintain, or even harden, its confrontational foreign policy while adopting a more pragmatic approach to managing its own population.

Then there is the question of Mojtaba Khamenei. Will he manage to consolidate authority as his father did, or will he ultimately become one of several powerful decision-makers, rather than the dominant figure within the system?

The answers remain far from clear. Nor should the IRGC's growing influence automatically be interpreted as the end of the clerical establishment's political power. The balance between these institutions is still evolving.

But one thing is increasingly apparent: while international attention remains focused on Iran's military capabilities, nuclear program, and regional ambitions, the regime's domestic calculations may prove just as consequential in shaping the country's postwar trajectory.

The next chapter in Iran may be defined not only by its confrontation with the outside world, but by the bargain its rulers attempt to strike with their own people, not to liberalize the Islamic Republic, but to ensure its survival.

#Iran
#IranWar‌
Hamidreza Azizi Verified account @HamidRezaAz 15h
However promising these images may be — and they really are — we should not forget that this is something Iranian women fought for over many years and achieved, not something that was granted to them by the government.

It is true that we have seen a gradual weakening of the Islamic Republic's religious and ideological identity in favor of its security-oriented and pragmatic side. But the Islamic Republic still relies heavily on a minority of hardcore, ideologically committed supporters who feel increasingly uncomfortable with the gradual erosion of what they consider the foundational moral values of society.

The government is struggling to balance the demands of this constituency against the risk of sparking new unrest by putting excessive pressure on the majority of the population.

Moreover, tactical flexibility on the issue of hijab should not obscure the broader securitization of the state. One clear manifestation of this trend is the tightening of rules and regulations restricting contact with foreign media outlets, organizations, and individuals.

The Iranian state is in a period of transition, and its eventual direction will depend heavily on the outcome of the war. But when it comes to political freedoms and civil society, the trajectory is toward more restrictions, not fewer.
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Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش Verified account @citrinowicz
המצור עובד אבל לא מקרב הכרעה אלא הסלמה.

המצור על איראן אמנם עובד, אבל המצור הוא אמצעי ולא מטרה. כרגע אין אינדיקציה ברורה לכך שאיראן עומדת להיכנע או לקרוס כתוצאה ממנו. מנגד, המצור גובה מארה״ב משאבים צבאיים וכלכליים עצומים, ולא ברור כמה זמן תוכל להמשיך בו.

בטהראן מעריכים שיוכלו להחזיק מעמד יותר זמן מוושינגטון, במיוחד לאחר כניסת הקונגרס החדש בינואר, שעלולה להקשות על מימון המשך המצור וההיערכות הצבאית במפרץ.

לכן אנחנו נמצאים בחלון הזדמנויות מוגבל, עם הגעת נושאת המטוסים השלישית לאזור ולפני כניסת הקונגרס החדש. אלא שכאן טמונה הבעיה: חזרה למערכה צבאית או המשך המצור יחלישו את איראן, אך לא בהכרח ישיגו את היעד המרכזי, קרי כניעה במשא ומתן או קריסת המשטר.

זהו הפרדוקס האסטרטגי האמריקני: עליונות צבאית מוחלטת אינה מתורגמת בהכרח ליכולת לכפות הכרעה מדינית. כל עוד בטהראן מאמינים שכניעה מסוכנת לשרידות המשטר יותר מהמשך ההתשה, גם הגברת הלחץ לא תבטיח את שבירתו. והעמדה הזו לא הולכת להשתנות בקרוב, ואיראן לא תפסיק לתקוך מיכליות במפרץ.

בשורה התחתונה, הבעיה אינה היעדר יכולת להכאיב לאיראן, אלא היעדר מנגנון ברור שיתרגם את הפעלת הלחץ הצבאי והכלכלי להכרעה מדינית. ככל שהזמן חולף, המחיר האמריקני עולה, חלון ההזדמנויות מצטמצם, ואיראן עשויה להעריך שעצם יכולתה להחזיק מעמד היא הדרך שלה לנצח.
Eran Efrat Verified account @Eran_Efrat 1d
*מטוטלת הורמוז*
אני אתחיל מהסוף: המצור עובד.
הנפט (יחסית) יוצא, איראן חסומה, המדינות השכנות (בעיקר עיראק) מייצאות ואיראן עוברת לחות׳יזציה מוחלטת- זאת אומרת לתחזק את הורמוז כ- High risk zone.
היא פוגעת במיכליות פה ושם ושומרת עדיין על תמחור גבוה על אף הירידות האחרונות.
זה מה שבעצם מצליח להחזיק את המחירים היחסית גבוהים- בסוף גם 95$ אלו עדיין 25$ יותר מאשר המחיר לפני המלחמה ובתוספת לוגיסטיקה יקרה ופרמיות סיכון, התמחור עוד לא Sustainable.
אבל איראן עושה עוד משהו- היא ״משחקת״ עם ה- Flow. זאת אומרת, ברצונה או שלא, הנפט לא מצליח לזרום בכמות אחידה וקבועה מה שלא מאפשר לבתי הזיקוק לתכנן קדימה ומה שלא מאפשר לתכנן לוגיסטיקה כמו שצריך.
ולוגיסטיקה Is the king. אם פעם יכולת לתכנן מיכליות חודשים קדימה ולהנות מתמחור זול, היום אתה משתתף במכירה פומבית מהיום למחר- ועם זה, קשה מאד להתנהל בטווח הארוך.
המשמעות היא שהבעיה המרכזית כרגע היא בחלוקה של הנפט, וכבר לא בייצור שלו.

לגבי איראן- היא עברה לייצר ולספק רק לשוק המקומי ועצרה את רוב מערך השאיבה.
היא מצליחה להבריח החוצה קצת במסופים יבשתיים וקצת בהלבנה (החלפות מסמכים) תחת נפט ״עיראקי״- אבל זה לא מספיק.

כרגע האתגר האמריקני הוא איך לשפר את אחידות הזרימה מהורמוז ומערך החלוקה העולמי.
זה המנוף האיראני היחידי שעדיין מציק לכלכלת הנפט העולמית.
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